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The Second Amendment as a
Fundamental Right
by TIMOTHY ZICK1*

Introduction
The Second Amendment has been suffering from an inferiority
complex. Litigants, scholars, and judges have complained that the right to
keep and bear arms is not being afforded the respect and dignity befitting a
“fundamental” constitutional right. They have asserted that, both on its own
terms and relative to rights in the same general class, the Second Amendment
has been disrespected, under-enforced, and orphaned. They have argued that
courts have treated the Second Amendment as “peripheral,” “fringe,”
“anachronistic,” “second rate,” and “second-class.”2
The Second
Amendment has been described as “the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of
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*
John Marshall Professor of Government and Citizenship, William & Mary Law School. I
would like to thank Joseph Blocher and Eric Ruben for providing thoughtful comments on a draft
of the Article. I would also like to thank the Giffords Law Center and the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly for organizing the symposium “Heller at 10: A Symposium on the Last – and Next
– Decade of the Modern Second Amendment.”
1. See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Peruta v. California,
137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Second Amendment has been treated less favorably than other constitutional rights); Amicus
Curiae Brief of National Rifle Association of America in Support of Petitioner at 22, Walker v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (No. 15-1027) (“The rights secured by the Second
Amendment are not second-class rights, and this Court should grant certiorari to ensure that they
are not relegated to that disfavored status.”).
2. See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willet, J., dissenting)
(“Constitutional scholars have dubbed the Second Amendment ‘the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill
of Rights.’ As Judge Ho relates, it is spurned as peripheral, despite being just as fundamental as
the First Amendment. It is snubbed as anachronistic, despite being just as enduring as the Fourth
Amendment. It is scorned as fringe, despite being just as enumerated as the other Bill of Rights
guarantees.”); Robert J. Cottrol, Taking Second Amendment Rights Seriously, 26 HUM. RTS. 5, 5
(Fall 1999) (“[T]he Second Amendment has become the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of
Rights . . . .”). Note that the Cottrol article was published a decade before the Supreme Court
recognized an individual’s right to keep and bear arms. For those unfamiliar with the comedian
Rodney Dangerfield and his “no respect” routine, see Rodney Dangerfield, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rodney_Dangerfield (last visited January 28, 2019).
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Rights” and even compared to Rosa Parks––i.e., a constitutional right that is
forced to sit at “the back of our constitutional bus.”3
This Article assesses the full range of “second-class” claims. I concede
at the outset that comparisons across constitutional provisions, which most
“second-class” claims invite or entail, are a complicated exercise.4 Among
other things, they suggest some agreed-upon normative basis for determining
whether or when particular rights are being disrespected or under-enforced.
The baselines for making such claims are far from clear, and they involve
contested normative judgments.5 However, judged according to all of the
benchmarks at our disposal––conceptual, qualitative, quantitative, and
doctrinal––“second-class” claims generally fall short.
Indeed, reviewing the available evidence, the Article generally rejects
“second-class” claims as either false or significantly overstated. Many of the
claims are based on false premises, including the notion that the Supreme
Court and lower courts immediately and aggressively expand the scope of
fundamental rights once they are recognized, that all fundamental rights are
created and enforced equally, that the absence of strict scrutiny is
demonstrative of lower-class status, and that low success rates demonstrate
under-enforcement.6 As recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller7 and
interpreted in the lower courts, the Second Amendment exhibits all the
hallmarks of a fundamental constitutional right. It is a non-economic,
individual dignity right that is considered “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”8
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3. See Cottrol, supra note 2. See also John Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Second(-Class)
Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/supremecourt-second-amendment-rights/.
4. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Romanticism Meets Realism in Second Amendment
Adjudication, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 33, 37 (2018) (observing that among other things such
comparisons require controlling for variations among rights and rendering them
“interchangeable”).
5. Id. at 36–37 (“Inescapably, whether you think the Second Amendment is being over- or
under-enforced, or optimally enforced, is a normative judgment dependent on other factors.”).
6. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007)
(observing that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent indicator of fundamentality);
Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L. J. 1434 (2018) (examining success rates in Second
Amendment cases).
7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. See id. at 628–29. See also McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761, 767 (2010) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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Constructed in the image of the Free Speech Clause and analogized in
those terms by many courts,9 the right to keep and bear arms exerts a
powerful influence on constitutional discourse and political outcomes.10 To
be sure, success rates for Second Amendment claims have been low, and
lower courts have not generally interpreted Heller broadly. However, the
available evidence does not show that either the results or the restraint are
the product of judicial hostility, resistance, or political ideology.11 Indeed,
many “second-class” claims appear to be disagreements with the merits of
lower court interpretations of Heller or criticisms of the manner in which the
Court itself defined and limited the right to keep and bear arms in the first
place. While it is true that Heller has been “narrowed from below,” it is not
true that this narrowing was either unauthorized by the Supreme Court or
unreasonable.12 Indeed, as Richard Re has observed, “even if lower courts
have not adhered to the best reading of Heller, they have interpreted the
decision reasonably.”13
As this Article is going to print, one of the standard “second-class”
claims—that the Supreme Court has abandoned or “orphaned” the Second
Amendment—has already been answered.14 While the Supreme Court has
indeed been silent for a decade, thus leaving to lower courts the task of
constructing Second Amendment doctrines, the Court has recently granted
certiorari in a Second Amendment case.15 Even before the Court granted
review, it was clear that the Court had not abandoned the Second
Amendment for all time.16 Indeed, its decade-long silence was not
exceptional.
Other fundamental rights have experienced greater
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9. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 595 (invoking First Amendment); David B. Kopel & Joseph
G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193
(2017) (discussing court’s reliance on First Amendment in Second Amendment decisions).
10. See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014).
11. See infra Parts II and III.
12. Richard Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEORGETOWN L.J.
921, 961 (2016).
13. Id. at 962.
14. See Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases, and an
Absent Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17, 20 (2018) (“The oracular Court has maintained
a resolute silence now for nearly a decade, while the notionally ‘inferior’ priesthood has been
charged with providing answers to a plethora of concrete cases.”).
15. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, WL 271961.
16. See Josh Blackman, Justice Thomas: Second Amendment is not a ‘Second-Class Right,’
NAT’L REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428173/justice-thomassecond-amendment-not-second-class-right-josh-blackman (“By refusing to intervene when lower
courts disregard the right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has done exactly what Chicago
wanted, and abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”).
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17. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro & Matthew Larosiere, The Supreme Court is too Gun-Shy on the
Second Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-courtis-too-gun-shy-on-the-second-amendment-11546473290. The claim that the Supreme Court has
“abandoned” the Second Amendment is discussed in Part V.D.
18. See, e.g., Todd E. Petty, The N.R.A.’s Strict Scrutiny Amendments (U. Iowa Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 2018-17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=324408
1&download=yes (analyzing N.R.A. proposals to amend state constitutions to provide that Second
Amendment burdens must survive strict scrutiny and describing them as an attempt to build “an
iron wall around” gun rights).
19. See Darrell A. H. Miller, The Second Amendment and Second-Class Rights, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-andsecond-class-rights/ (suggesting that such claims may be rhetorical).
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abandonment, and some even apparent exile. Thus, nothing about the
Supreme Court’s post-Heller treatment of the Second Amendment suggested
its “second-class” status.17
In short, if there were a “Rodney Dangerfield Award” for fundamental
constitutional rights, the Second Amendment would not currently be a very
strong contender. In any event, our experience with fundamental rights
shows that what courts have made of the Second Amendment in its first
decade will not dictate what the right will become in subsequent decades.
For firearms proponents, there are reasons to be optimistic in this regard.
The Second Amendment’s inferiority complex has led to calls for
recognition of a kind of super-right, one defined in absolute terms and
buttressed by the most rigid standards.18 In light of the Second Amendment’s
actual status, such exhortations represent a significant and ultimately unwise
over-compensation. Whatever it becomes, by whatever dynamics will
ultimately affect it, the Second Amendment’s path should be determined
according to an accurate assessment of both its actual and relative status
among fundamental constitutional rights. Its development should not be the
product of over-compensation by the Supreme Court.
Part I provides a basic typology of the various “second-class” claims
that have been advanced by litigants, scholars, and judges. “Second-class”
arguments may be largely strategic or rhetorical—a means of goading, or
perhaps guilting, the Supreme Court into reviewing and invalidating laws
that burden Second Amendment rights.19 Part I instead treats the claims as
substantive and normative. It identifies four types of “second-class” claims:
conceptual, doctrinal, enforcement-related, and attitudinal. Critics complain
that the Second Amendment has not been properly conceptualized or defined
as a fundamental right, has been subjected to “second-class” doctrinal
treatment, has been under-enforced by courts; and has been marginalized and
disrespected owing to judicial bias. The remainder of the Article challenges
these four general claims.
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20. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
23. See generally Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases
Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 WILL. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827 (2017) (observing that
available empirical evidence does not support the claim that gun rights cases are politically
charged).
24. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6.
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Part II argues that judged according to traditional indicia of
constitutional rights in general, and fundamental rights in particular, the
Second Amendment has been conceived and defined as a fundamental right.
In Heller itself and post-Heller lower court decisions, the Second
Amendment has been conceptualized as a non-absolute, but strongly
constituted, constitutional right that can sometimes trump ordinary policy
concerns. In these basic and minimal respects, at least, the Second
Amendment bears the hallmarks of a fundamental constitutional right.
Part III focuses on “second-class” enforcement claims. It carefully
reviews all of the available qualitative and quantitative literature on the
subject of Second Amendment enforcement and concludes that the available
evidence does not support several “second-class” enforcement claims. The
evidence does not support claims of outright hostility and widespread
resistance to Heller or to Second Amendment claims and claimants. It is the
case that some lower court decisions express the sort of institutional concerns
that sometimes indicate under-enforcement of constitutional norms.20
However, these statements are equally likely to be associated with principles
of judicial restraint or judicial minimalism. Further, Heller’s own
ambiguities may be responsible for lower court reticence to expand Second
Amendment rights beyond the parameters the Court established. The data
show that Second Amendment success rates are notably low.21 However,
that fact alone does not demonstrate either under-enforcement of the right to
keep and bear arms itself or a comparative disadvantage with regard to other
constitutional rights.22 Evidence of ideological or attitudinal bias affecting
Second Amendment claims is also weak.23 Finally, the evidence shows that
in Second Amendment cases, courts are using standards and methodologies
that are common to fundamental rights claims.24 The available data strongly
suggest that the Second Amendment is being legalized and normalized as
part of the Constitution’s existing system of fundamental rights. That
process will continue as the Supreme Court and lower courts decide more
Second Amendment cases.
Part IV more directly addresses claims that the Second Amendment has
been treated as “second-class” relative to other fundamental constitutional
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rights. The claim that all fundamental rights are created and enforced on
equal terms is demonstrably false. Moreover, within the existing rights
hierarchy, both on its own terms and relative to other fundamental rights in
its class, the Second Amendment is hardly a B-list right. To sharpen the
comparative lens, the Part focuses in particular on a favorite comparator for
Second Amendment “second-class” claimants—the Free Speech Clause. It
first compares the two rights in their respective first decades of enforcement.
It then assesses “second-class” claims against contemporary free speech and
other fundamental rights standards. These comparisons offer important, but
perhaps surprising, insights in terms of current arguments for “first-class”
status on behalf of the Second Amendment. One insight is that the real
source of “second-class” claimants’ angst is Heller itself, which appears to
articulate a rather narrow conception of the right to keep and bear arms.
Another is that treating every law or regulation that incidentally burdens
Second Amendment rights as subject to heightened scrutiny would provide
favored, not equal, treatment for the right to keep and bear arms. In short, it
would produce an anomaly in the fundamental rights hierarchy: a kind of
super-right. The Part concludes with a critical assessment of the claims that
the Second Amendment has been orphaned, abandoned, or neglected,
particularly relative to other fundamental rights. In this sense, as in others,
“second-class” claims overreach.
The Article’s Conclusion briefly looks forward to the Second
Amendment’s second decade and beyond. The substance and status of
fundamental rights can change markedly over time. The scope and meaning
of the Second Amendment has not been settled in its first post-recognition
decade, any more than the Free Speech Clause was forever defined by the
same era. The Supreme Court will soon clarify, and likely expand, the scope
of the right to keep and bear arms. However, like other rights in its class, the
Second Amendment is not likely to become the absolute right that some
advocates desire. The right to keep and bear arms is likely to operate much
as freedom of speech and other fundamental rights do—as a strong trump in
some cases, but a right that is subject to certain limits in the name of other
rights or public interests. Those limits and interests ought to be carefully
considered against a backdrop that paints an accurate picture of the Second
Amendment in its first decade.

02/26/2019 14:13:21
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I. A Typology of “Second-Class” Claims
The claim that the Second Amendment is, or has been treated as, a
“second-class” constitutional right takes many forms.25 This Part develops
a basic typology of such claims. It assumes that there is substance to the
“second-class” claims—in other words, that they are not merely rhetorical
or instrumental complaints intended to influence judicial or public opinion
(although they may serve that purpose as well).26 “Second-class” arguments
can be somewhat difficult to define and separate. They are not always
precisely drawn. They also share in common a comparative component,
which often suggests either (a) all fundamental rights are treated equally,27
or (b) there is indeed a hierarchy of rights and the Second Amendment has
been improperly relegated to its cellar.28 The first of these complaints is
demonstrably false, and the Article disputes the second. In any event, some
useful distinctions can be drawn and these allow for a holistic analysis of
“second-class” claims. There are four types or forms of “second-class”
claim: conceptual, enforcement-related, doctrinal, and ideological. This Part
describes the basic claim types. The remainder of the Article critically
analyzes “second-class” claims in all their forms.

A. Conceptual
One version of the “second-class” critique is that the Second
Amendment has not been properly conceptualized or defined as a
fundamental constitutional right. The basic complaint is that the Second
Amendment has not been properly elevated, in conceptual terms, to
“fundamental” status.29
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 67 Side A
02/26/2019 14:13:21

25. See Miller, supra note 19 (suggesting that such claims may be rhetorical, descriptive, or
normative).
26. See id. (suggesting that some “second-class” claims may be merely rhetorical).
27. See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (Thomas, J., with whom Gorsuch, J. joins,
dissenting) (“The Constitution does not rank certain rights above others, and I do not think this
Court should impose such a hierarchy by selectively enforcing its preferred rights.”).
28. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy v. United States Postal Service, 136 S. Ct. 1486
(2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further warranted because the deferential form of
intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s
precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates how
the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a second-class right.”).
29. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 945 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Callahan, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment is not a ‘second-class’ constitutional
guarantee.”); Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In
construing the statute before us expansively so that causing a single minor reckless injury or
offensive touching can lead someone to lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues to
‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (quoting Friedman v. City of Highland
Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))); Silvester v.
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This form of “second-class” argument is based, in part, on the notion
that constitutional rights––in particular “fundamental” rights––are part of a
distinct class of rights. These rights, which exhibit certain indicia of
fundamentality, are entitled to special—and equal—treatment by courts.30
In its most extreme form, this form of “second-class” claim asserts that
the Second Amendment is not being accorded the status of a “right” at all, in
the sense that it does not constrain government action within its domain. In
its more particular form, the argument is that the Second Amendment has
not been conceptualized as a strong trump on certain governmental actions.
Rather, it has operated as one among many competing policy considerations
that legislatures take into account.
These claims require a basic understanding of what it means to assert
that something is, or is not, a constitutional “right.” The more specific form
assumes that there are common and agreed-upon indicia of fundamentality
as the concept pertains to rights. Conceptual and definitional claims, like
other “second-class” arguments, have a comparative aspect. They rest in
part on the premise that relative to other rights of the same class, the Second
Amendment has been conceptually misinterpreted or disfavored.

B. Doctrinal
Another form of “second-class” argument focuses explicitly on
doctrinal comparisons between the Second Amendment and other
fundamental constitutional rights, including the First Amendment’s free
speech right. Critics have argued that Second Amendment doctrine, which
has developed in the lower courts, is not appropriate for a fundamental
right.31 Some have also asserted that the Supreme Court’s failure to clarify
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 67 Side B
02/26/2019 14:13:21

Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The right to keep and bear arms is apparently
this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1999 (“The Court’s decision to deny
certiorari in this case reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a
disfavored right.”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit from relegating the Second
Amendment to a second-class right.”). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–39, Voisine,
136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (No. 14-10154); Josh Blackman, Justice Thomas Speaks Truth to Power:
Second Amendment is not a Second-Class Right, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/03/01/justice-thomas-speaks-truth-to-power-secondamendment-is-not-a-second-class-right/ (referring to a “rank double standard” and concluding that
“Thomas’s questions from the bench are meant to illicit [sic] the subjugation of the Second
Amendment”).
30. See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (“we remain ever mindful
not to treat the Second Amendment any differently from other individual rights.”).
31. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s
review is further warranted because the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by the
panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents regarding how infringements on
fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates how the lower courts are turning the Second

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 68 Side A

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ZICK_UPDATED TO PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2019]

2/25/2019 1:24 PM

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

629

Second Amendment doctrines has disfavored or disadvantaged the right to
keep and bear arms vis-à-vis other fundamental rights.32
Doctrinal “second-class” claims are related to enforcement claims,
which are discussed below.33 The basic premise is that courts have applied
more lenient doctrinal frameworks or standards to Second Amendment
claims than either fundamental status dictates or a comparative assessment
of like-situated fundamental rights reveals to be correct.34 This is part of the
basis for the conceptual claim that the Second Amendment rests at or near
the bottom of the Constitution’s fundamental rights hierarchy. Through
either active misinterpretation or neglect, critics have claimed, the Second
Amendment has been doctrinally disfavored.
As we will see, like other “second-class” claims, comparative doctrinal
claims pose analytical challenges. While there are some overarching themes
and methods, the Supreme Court has developed fundamental rights doctrines
in an essentially ad hoc manner. We can certainly rely on the existence of
categorical rules, interest balancing, and levels of scrutiny to some degree.
However, precise comparisons across fundamental rights are difficult.
Nevertheless, we can identify and compare the doctrinal conceptions or
methods that are articulated and held to apply to different fundamental rights.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

The Court has not heard argument in a Second Amendment case in over seven
years—since March 2, 2010, in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Since
that time, we have heard argument in, for example, roughly 35 cases where the
question presented turned on the meaning of the First Amendment and 25 cases
that turned on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This discrepancy is
inexcusable, especially given how much less developed our jurisprudence is with
respect to the Second Amendment as compared to the First and Fourth
Amendments.
Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1999 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. See Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799–800 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“Second Amendment rights are no less protected by our Constitution than other
rights enumerated in that document . . . .”).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 68 Side A

Amendment into a second-class right.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of
San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015) (No. 14-704) (“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that
the Second Amendment may not ‘be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment,’ courts continue to do just that. Whether through summary reversal or plenary review,
this Court should use this opportunity to put an end to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted)
(quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010))).
32. See Friedman, 136 S. Ct. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s refusal to review
a decision that flouts two of our Second Amendment precedents stands in marked contrast to the
Court’s willingness to summarily reverse courts that disregard our other constitutional decisions.”).
As Justice Thomas wrote in another case:
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C. Enforcement
A central “second-class” claim is that the lower courts, and again the
Supreme Court by virtue of its neglect, have “underenforced” the Second
Amendment in its first decade.35 This claim focuses primarily on actual
results in court cases––wins and losses. However, it is related to the
conceptual and doctrinal claims, in the sense that the latter are presumably
influencing case results. Underenforcement has been a common refrain in
petitions for certiorari.36 It has also been emphasized in academic
literature.37
Enforcement claims rely heavily––although not exclusively––on the
notably low success rates of Second Amendment claimants. They also rely
on things such as the “overall effect and tenor” of lower court decisions and
an impression that courts are approaching Second Amendment claims with
unwarranted skepticism.38 Some critics paint a rather dystopian vision of the

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 68 Side B
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35. See generally Sager, supra note 20 (discussing concept of under-enforced constitutional
norms).
36. See, e.g., Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“Rather than
perform their duty to enforce the Constitution, lower courts are attempting to eradicate the Second
Amendment by disregarding the Bill of Rights and the precedents of this Court.”); Brief for the
American Civil Rights Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Kachalsky v. Cacace,
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-845) (“The court below also embraced stepchild, second class status
for the Second Amendment, contrary to both Heller and McDonald.”); Petitioners’ Reply Brief at
2, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further
warranted because the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below
is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are
analyzed and demonstrates how the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a secondclass right.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799
(2014) (No. 14-704) (“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that the Second Amendment may
not ‘be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment,’ courts continue to do just
that. Whether through summary reversal or plenary review, this Court should use this opportunity
to put an end to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010))); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. McCraw,
134 S. Ct. 1365 (2014) (No. 13-390) (“We urge this Court to grant review in this case both to
reaffirm that the Second Amendment’s guaranty is not a ‘second-class’ fundamental right and to
establish that responsible, law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old adults are not second-class citizens.”).
37. See, e.g., Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 196 (2017) (concluding, based on qualitative
assessment, that lower courts are generally under-enforcing the Second Amendment); Robert J.
Cottrol & George A. Mocsary, Guns, Bird Feathers, and Overcriminalization: Why Courts Should
Take the Second Amendment Seriously, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 33 (2016) (arguing that
lower courts are “undercutting . . . Supreme Court precedent” in a way that is suggestive of
“something other than a desire to control crime”); Michael P. O’Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery
Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower Federal Courts and What It Has to Do with
Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (2014) (characterizing the
“tenor” of lower court Second Amendment decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to
claims that the Second Amendment limits government action”).
38. See O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1409–10.
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Second Amendment’s enforcement in the lower courts. They argue that
there is an “assault on gun rights” by lower courts, and accuse judges of
effectively “rewriting” Heller.39 Some have even argued that lower courts
have engaged in a form of “massive resistance” to Heller, and suggested that
they are in open rebellion against the Court’s decision.40 Finally, some have
placed the problem of under-enforcement at the feet of the Supreme Court.
They argue that the Court has been complicit, owing to the fact that in the
face of lower court resistance it has “abdicated” its judicial role by failing to
intervene and defend Heller and McDonald.41
Like other “second-class” claims, under-enforcement argument
assume––but generally do not state or provide––a comparative benchmark.
Thus, there is presumably some level of Second Amendment enforcement
that “second-class” critics would consider appropriate or optimal. In order
to make comparisons, there is also presumably an optimal enforcement level
for other fundamental rights. It is possible to compare success rates across
constitutional rights claims. However, without the requisite benchmarks,
these comparisons cannot demonstrate underenforcement. That does not
mean they are wholly unedifying. Along with success rates, they represent
evidence to consider in terms of how and when the right to keep and bear
arms is being enforced.
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39. See, e.g., Editorial, Waiting for Justice Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/waiting-for-justice-gorsuch-1487893991 [https://perma.cc/VCU6SBYS] (referring to a “lower-court assault on gun rights”); Charles C. W. Cooke, The Fourth
Circuit Runs Roughshod Over Heller and the Second Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 22, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445145/fourth-circuit-decision-maryland-assaultweapons-ban-constitutional-travesty [https://perma.cc/349K-XLAC] (suggesting “the Fourth
Circuit has taken it upon itself to rewrite Heller”).
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447
(2015) (No. 15-133); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (No. 13-827)
(describing “lower courts’ massive resistance to Heller”); Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by
Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673
(2014) (“In the wake of the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller (‘Heller I’) and
McDonald v. Chicago decisions that clarify, expand, and protect Second Amendment rights, federal
and state inferior courts have been engaging in massive resistance.” (citations omitted)); Editorial,
Massive Gun Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/ articles/SB
10001424127887324600704578402760760473. Commentators have drawn explicit comparisons
between post-Heller decisions and resistance to the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223,
224 (2014); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 230, 230 (2014). See also Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37, at 30 (claiming
that some courts have “defied decades of fundamental rights jurisprudence”).
41. See Blackman, supra note 16 (“By refusing to intervene when lower courts disregard the
right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has done exactly what Chicago wanted, and
abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”).
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Notwithstanding these concerns, it is possible to assess certain aspects
of “second-class” enforcement claims, including the importance of the
overall success rate and factors influencing that rate.42 One thing this
evidence shows is that merely tabulating wins and losses does not suffice to
demonstrate that the Second Amendment has been under-enforced. Another
is that focusing solely on court decisions does not account for subconstitutional legislation that, at present, strongly supports gun rights.43

D. Ideological

02/26/2019 14:13:21

42. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6.
43. See Miller, supra note 4, at 39–40 (observing that states and localities express political
sentiments about the appropriate scope of gun rights).
44. See O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1421 (claiming that lower court decisions reveal “a
profound partisan divide”). But see Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 861 (concluding that
ideology “might play a small role” in resolving gun rights claims).
45. Heller: Past, Present, and Future, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 367 (Spring, 2018)
(comments of Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds).
46. Id.
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Arguments about the tone, tenor, or hostility of lower court decisions
point to a final form of “second-class” claim. Ideological claims posit that
judges have viewed and treated the Second Amendment as “second-class”
owing to partisan attitudes or personal biases. In other words, they assert
that judges are predisposed to rule against Second Amendment claimants,
and may even view the claimants themselves as “second-class.”
Some critics assert that biases rooted in partisan ideology consign the
Second Amendment to second-tier status. One form of this argument is that
the low success rate for Second Amendment claims can be traced to the
political party of the president who nominated the judge deciding the case.44
There are other measures of partisan ideology, but the basic claim is that
ideology is driving the Second Amendment down.
Others point to class-based biases, specifically the purported elitism of
judges on the federal bench. Thus, Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds claims
that the relative lack of protection for Second Amendment rights stems from
the fact that federal judges are drawn from an elite, educated, privileged pool
of individuals who do not hold such rights in high regard. He argues that the
Second Amendment is regarded as second-class by “members of the
chattering class,” who care more about things like freedom of speech than
gun rights.45 According to Professor Reynolds, protection for gun rights has
come almost exclusively from “the two branches of the government that are
not reserved for wealthy people with postgraduate degrees.”46 Professor
Sanford Levison articulated a similar criticism long before Heller, arguing
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that the “elite” bar and legal academy had declined to embrace a robust
interpretation of the Second Amendment.47
These arguments might be considered possible causal explanations for
“second-class” enforcement of the Second Amendment. The typology treats
them as a separate genre of claim, however, owing to the fact that they
represent an alleged perspective on the Second Amendment that views the
right to keep and bear arms as less legitimate than other fundamental rights.

II. The Second Amendment as a “Fundamental Right”
As discussed in Part II, a general complaint, common to all of forms of
“second-class” arguments, is that the Second Amendment is not being
accorded the dignity, respect, and regard typically shown fundamental
constitutional rights. This begs a few preliminary, but important, questions.
What does it mean to say that something is a constitutional “right”? What
does it mean to assert that a constitutional right is “fundamental”? The point
of asking these questions is not to engage deeply with philosophical or
theoretical accounts of rights. However, in order to have a general
framework for understanding the various types of “second-class” claims, we
ought first to identify the indicia or standards relating to the purported class
of rights to which the Second Amendment belongs.

A. Constitutional Rights – Conceptions and Characteristics

Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989).

02/26/2019 14:13:21

47.
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It might seem self-evident that the individual right to keep and bear
arms has been defined and conceptualized as a fundamental constitutional
right. After all, Heller expressly recognized the right and McDonald
described it as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and hence
applicable to the states. Yet some forms of “second-class” argument appear
to be based on the idea that there is something different, and less favorable,
about (in particular) judicial perceptions of the Second Amendment.
Some of these complaints relate to Heller itself, which arguably
recognized a relatively narrow constitutional right. Understanding, in broad
terms, what constitutional rights are can help contextualize the Second
Amendment as a constitutional right. There is a vast and growing
philosophical literature on moral and legal rights. It is not my intention to
open that can of worms. The focus here will be far more general in nature.
The idea is to start from first and general principles, and then progress to
more specific aspects of “second-class” claims.
As Professor Fred Schauer recently observed, “the common positive
law approach to rights, an approach seemingly reflected in our ordinary
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48. Frederick Schauer, Rightful Deprivations of Rights 9 (Va. Public L. and Legal Research
Paper No. 2018-43, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3221184.
49. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
50. Id. at 635.
51. See id. at 626.
52. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). For a critique of the
conception of rights as “trumps,” see generally Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132
HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018).
53. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191.
54. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004).
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discourse about rights, is to formulate rights in somewhat general terms but
to understand the rights as so formulated as subject to being overridden or
outweighed by other and especially weighty considerations.”48 In a general
sense, Heller defined and conceptualized the Second Amendment in this
manner—i.e., in general terms and subject to certain exceptions. Thus, for
example, the decision observed that only firearms in “common use” are
protected, felons can be dispossessed of firearms, and firearms can be banned
in “sensitive places” such as schools.49 Heller explicitly rejected so-called
“interest balancing” in Second Amendment cases.50 However, it also took
care to describe the right being recognized as one that is not absolute.51 Thus,
in common with other rights, the right to keep and bear arms can seemingly
be overridden—either by competing or conflicting individual rights or by
public concerns.
As discussed below, this is essentially what Ronald Dworkin appeared
to mean when he once described constitutional rights as “trumps.”52
Dworkin defined constitutional rights as moral claims against government,
subject to override in some instances, but only for very weighty reasons.53
To be sure, the degree to which the Second Amendment acts as a “trump”
remains a point of very serious contention. However, Heller and McDonald
both made clear that the Second Amendment cannot be traded off in ways
that, say, non-rights may be. Thus, for example, an individual has a right to
keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense—seemingly regardless of
the dangers or harms a political community might ascribe to this particular
activity. The same obviously cannot be said of all forms of activity engaged
in within the home.
Professor Jack Balkin has offered a different perspective on the
meaning of constitutional rights. He conceptualizes constitutional rights as
“a form of discourse, a way of thinking about the needs of social order and
human liberty in the context of a changing world.”54 According to Balkin,
constitutional rights are also “a source of power—first, because they are a
powerful form of rhetorical appeal, and second, because the enforcement of
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55. Balkin, supra note 54, at 53–54.
56. Id. at 54.
57. This was true even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. See Jeffrey M. Jones,
Americans in Agreement With Supreme Court on Gun Rights, GALLUP (June 26, 2008),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-agreement-supreme-court-gun-rights.aspx (noting
that three in four Americans polled agreed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to keep and bear arms).
58. See Blocher, supra note 10. See also Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the
Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better
Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); Dan Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory
Manifesto,” 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2003).
59. Balkin, supra note 54, at 57.
60. See Blocher, supra note 10, at 814 (noting Heller’s effect on passage of gun control laws).
61. Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry,” 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 437 (1992).
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rights recognized by the state is backed up the power of the state.”55 This
characterization of rights as a source of power helps to explain why so much
energy is devoted to advocating and defending on behalf of constitutional
rights. As Balkin observes: “For the discourse of rights is the discourse of
power, the restructuring of rights is the restructuring of power, and the
securing of rights is the securing of power.”56
The Second Amendment has clearly been conceptualized as a
constitutional right in these respects as well. It is, and has been for some
time, an important part of American cultural, political, and constitutional
discourses. The American public broadly supports the right recognized in
Heller.57 As a result, the Second Amendment has substantial rhetorical
appeal. Indeed, some commentators have expressed the concern that Second
Amendment rhetoric has contributed to dysfunctional policy debates
concerning gun rights and gun control.58
Whether or not that is so, there is no denying the force of Second
Amendment arguments. Like other constitutional rights, the Second
Amendment has been “a terrain of struggle in a world of continuous
change.”59 Thus far, firearms proponents have been able to cash in on the
rhetorical power of the right to keep and bear arms. One measure of their
success has been legislative receptiveness to Second Amendment arguments
and appeals. Particularly in state legislatures, the right to keep and bear arms
has been treated as anything but “second-class.”60 Countless state laws
preserve and protect Second Amendment rights, and legislatures in many
states are deterred from passing gun control measures. Whatever problems
Second Amendment claims may be experiencing in courts in terms of
claimant success rates, strong majoritarian preferences have produced a
markedly different narrative in state and federal legislatures.61

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 71 Side B

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ZICK_MACROED_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

636

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2/15/2019 5:21 PM

[Vol. 46:3

Like other constitutional rights, the right to keep and bear arms, again
as defined in Heller and in state and federal laws, is backed by the power and
authority of the state. The National Rifle Association and other civic groups
stand committed to defending and expanding Second Amendment rights,
which are part of a broad constitutional movement that produced Heller and
McDonald.62 The movement has an obvious strategic interest in convincing
its participants and others that Second Amendment rights have been
mistakenly conceptualized as “second-class.” However, the Second
Amendment bears the basic hallmarks of other rights in the broad class of
constitutional rights.

B. Indicia of Fundamentality

02/26/2019 14:13:21

62. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015).
63. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY NEW EDITION (2016).
64. Id.
65. See Fallon, supra note 6 (observing that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent
indicator of fundamentality).
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“Second-class” claimants may assert that although it has the basic
characteristics of other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment has not
been conceptualized as a “fundamental” constitutional right. This claim
concedes that certain rights are treated as special, in terms of their
recognition, prestige, and enforcement. It belies the notion that all rights are
created equal, or that the Supreme Court has never ranked constitutional
rights. In fact, the ranking of constitutional rights has long been a central
aspect of our constitutional jurisprudence.
How, then, are we to determine which rights are conceived of as special
or “fundamental”? Dictionary definitions can be misleading, if not
downright inaccurate. According to Merriam-Webster, for example, a
“fundamental right” is “a right that is considered by a court (as the U.S.
Supreme Court) to be explicitly or implicitly expressed in a constitution (as
the U.S. Constitution).”63 A Note accompanying the definition states: “A
court must review a law that infringes on a fundamental right under a
standard of strict scrutiny. A fundamental right can be limited by a law only
if there is a compelling state interest.”64
Both the definition and accompanying Note are incorrect. Not all rights
that are expressed, either explicitly or implicitly, in the U.S. Constitution are
treated as “fundamental.” Even with respect to those deemed worthy of the
label, as discussed below “strict scrutiny” is not always—or indeed even
typically—the governing standard.65 A law student who relied on this
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particular definition and understanding of “fundamental” rights on a
constitutional law exam would not do very well.
At the same time, even the most astute law students and lawyers might
reasonably be confused about the correct definition. The problem, as one
commentator has observed, is that “the Supreme Court has never bothered to
define with any precision what counts as a ‘fundamental right.’”66 As
another scholar has noted, there is no single “unifying principle for assessing
the fundamentality of rights.”67 Rather, fundamental rights jurisprudence is
the product of “a pastiche of constitutional interpretation.”68
Three general standards or indicia of fundamentality have been
expressed or implied by the Supreme Court:
First, following footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., we might consider all of the individual rights
guaranteed in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights to
be fundamental. Second, we might alternatively view all of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated to
apply against the states to be fundamental; the test for
incorporation asks if a right is fundamental to American political
institutions and our system of justice. Finally, we might define
as fundamental those rights that have been thought of as
‘preferred rights’ because of their role in promoting human
dignity or democratic self-government.69

02/26/2019 14:13:21

66. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 228 (2006).
67. Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 MIAMI
L. REV. 101, 106 (2002).
68. Id. at 112. The problem appears to be universal. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice
Ginsburg’s Charge That the Constitution Is ‘Skimpy’ in Comparison to Our International
Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in American and Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 951, 954 (1998) (noting that the terms “human rights,” “freedoms,” “fundamental human
rights,” “fundamental freedoms,” “rights and freedoms,” and “fundamental rights” appear to be
used interchangeably around the world).
69. Winkler, supra note 66, at 228 (internal citations omitted).
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When applying these various approaches, the Court has relied on
analogies and precedents to populate or round out the category of
“fundamental” rights. Thus, insofar as a right resembles or shares the
characteristics of a right already recognized as fundamental, it is more likely
to be accorded the same status.
We could also take a more philosophical approach to defining
fundamentality. Again following Ronald Dworkin, we might say that
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70.
71.
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DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191.
RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 31 (2006).
72. Id.
73. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–67 (discussing development of
“incorporation” doctrine).
74. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
75. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–68 (holding that Second Amendment right is fundamental
and thus incorporated against states).
76. Id. at 180.
77. Id. at 181.
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although not all constitutional rights represent moral rights of sufficient
weight to constrain government in most circumstances, “those Constitutional
rights that we call fundamental like the right of free speech, are supposed to
represent rights against the Government in the strong sense; that is the point
of the boast that our legal system respects the fundamental rights of the
citizen.”70 For Dworkin, these rights “mark off and protect” a category of
distinctive interests, and hence cannot typically be sacrificed to majority
preferences or considerations of general utility.71 Hence they prevail “over
the kind of trade-off argument that normally justifies political action.”72 In
sum, a constitutional right might be considered “fundamental” if in at least
some circumstances it operates as a strong trump against governmental
action.
Whatever standard one adopts, the Second Amendment as conceived in
Heller and McDonald readily qualifies as “fundamental.” First, it is among
the rights expressly listed in the Bill of Rights. As the Court has indicated,
all such rights are presumptively fundamental.
Second, the right to keep and bear arms is also “fundamental” under the
Court’s “incorporation” doctrine.73 Under that doctrine, which the Court has
used to determine which provisions of the Bill of Rights are to be applied to
states and localities as well as the national government, the Court asks
whether the right is considered to be “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” or “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”74 In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme
Court held that the individual right to keep and bear arms recognized in
Heller was fundamental according to these standards.75 The Court rejected
the government’s arguments to the contrary, expressly characterizing them
as a plea to treat the Second Amendment as a “second-class” right.76 This,
said the Court, would be “inconsistent with the long-established standard we
apply in incorporation cases.”77
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78. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
79. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 (discussing non-incorporated rights provisions).
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Not exactly. Under the incorporation standard, not all of the rights
expressly provided for in the Bill of Rights are considered “fundamental.”
Although Justice Black encouraged his colleagues to incorporate the Bill of
Rights provisions in toto, the Court declined to do so, engaging instead in a
process of “selective” incorporation.78 Under this approach, the Third
Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement, the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on excessive fines are not yet considered “fundamental.”79 Thus, some Bill
of Rights provisions are indeed “second-class,” at least from an
incorporation standpoint. However, McDonald makes quite clear that the
Second Amendment is not among them.
Third, Heller and McDonald recognized a relation between personal
self-defense, individual autonomy, and the right to keep and bear arms. In
that respect, the Second Amendment right resembles other (un-enumerated)
fundamental rights such as abortion, contraception, and marriage. It is a right
related to the preservation of life, and hence of human dignity. Although
Heller and McDonald characterized the core of the Second Amendment right
in terms of self-defense, it did not rule out additional justifications. For
instance, the Second Amendment might be characterized as a “political
process” right entitled to special consideration by the courts, in the sense that
it preserves citizen self-government in the face of tyrannical state actions.
Finally, under the Dworkinian conception of fundamentality, Heller
created a strong moral claim of right. With regard, at least, to regulations of
commonly kept firearms used for self-defense in the home, the rights-bearing
individual has a “trump” or strong claim that cannot be outweighed by
ordinary political considerations. This means that courts can and will
invalidate laws that burden or infringe upon such activity. This conception
does not mean the Second Amendment protects only such actions, but rather
that it is most likely to operate as a strong “trump” against state burdens or
infringements as to this aspect of the right. And this, indeed, is how Heller
defined the Second Amendment right––not in terms of its totality, but in
terms of its core, with future construction to follow.
Another indication that the Second Amendment has been
conceptualized or defined as “fundamental” relates to the fact that it was
fashioned in the image of the undoubtedly “first-class” free speech right set
forth in the First Amendment. Heller sought to burnish the Second
Amendment’s “fundamental” status by analogy.
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80. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 625–26 (2008).
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id. at 595.
83. As commentators predicted, however, some interest balancing was inevitable. See Joseph
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 375, 381 83 (2009) (explaining distinction between categoricalism and balancing
approaches and how this might affect interpretation of Second Amendment); Mark Tushnet, Heller
and the Perils of Compromise,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 421–22 (2009) (explaining that
some balancing in Second Amendment doctrine is inevitable).
84. Heller, 561 U.S. at 635.
85. Id. at 628 n.27.
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The Heller Court enhanced the Second Amendment’s historical
pedigree by explicitly comparing its origins to those of the First Amendment.
Both provisions, the Court asserted, codified pre-existing rights, and both
were the product of a long dormancy followed by renewed judicial
engagement.80
The Court also invoked the Free Speech Clause in addressing the
Second Amendment’s scope. It observed that just as the Free Speech
Clause’s protection extends to modern forms of communication (such as
speech on the Internet), so too must the Second Amendment’s scope extend
beyond the types of arms available at the founding.81 At the same time, the
Court observed that the Second Amendment, again like the First
Amendment, does not protect all exercises of the right.82 Both rights are
considered fundamental, but non-absolute.
Finally, in terms of methodology, the Court rejected calls for an
interest-balancing approach to Second Amendment rights—i.e., a weighing
of the individual’s right to keep and bear arms against the state’s interests in
regulating such activities.83 Once again, the majority opinion invoked the
free speech example: “The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech
guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity,
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely
unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no
different.”84 The Court also rejected any form of “rationality” review for
Second Amendment burdens, arguing that this form of low-level review had
never been applied in the free speech context.85
As noted, fundamentality-by-analogy is a common way to establish the
fundamental status of a constitutional right. The Court’s effort to associate
the Second Amendment with the First Amendment has borne considerable
fruit. In construing the Second Amendment, many lower courts and scholars
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86. See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 210–26 (2018) (examining the intersection of free
speech and Second Amendment doctrines).
87. See Fallon, supra note 6 (noting that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent
indicator of fundamental rights status or enforcement).
88. Winkler, supra note 66, at 229.
89. Id. at 232.
90. E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (adopting a framework for
analyzing such regulations that is more lenient than strict scrutiny).
91. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–72
(1980) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to commercial expression).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 74 Side A

have expressly invoked the First Amendment’s doctrines and principles.86
Following Heller’s lead, they have borrowed aspects of the First Amendment
to model the Second Amendment.
In sum, the Second Amendment has been conceptualized and defined
as a fundamental constitutional right under all of the existing standards and
approaches. The right to keep and bear arms, which operates as a strong
“trump” at its core, has been recognized as “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” and characterized as central to personal dignity and self-defense. It
has been compared to, and indeed modeled upon, the First Amendment’s
free speech guarantee. Given that the Supreme Court and many lower courts
have conceived of the Second Amendment in these explicit terms,
conceptual and definitional “second-class” claims fall flat.
Despite all these considerations, some “second-class” critics maintain
that the Second Amendment has not been conceived of as “fundamental” in
an important respect. Specifically, they argue that an important aspect of
fundamentality has generally been missing from lower court decisions––
namely, application of a “strict scrutiny” standard. As discussed further
below, it is true that lower courts have not regularly applied that level or
degree of scrutiny to firearms regulations. The reasons for this are varied,
and will be addressed.
At the conceptual or definitional level, the strict scrutiny argument is
inherently flawed. For one thing, as noted earlier, the argument that
fundamental status automatically triggers strict judicial scrutiny is
descriptively false.87 Thus, with regard to all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in the context of only two rights–
–the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.88 And even in those two
contexts, strict scrutiny has not been consistently applied.89 Thus, for
example, content-neutral regulations of speech are subject to an intermediate
standard of review.90 So are regulations of commercial speech.91 To take
another example, under the Free Exercise Clause, neutral and generally
applicable laws that burden religious exercise are essentially treated as
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unreviewable or subject to minimal judicial scrutiny.92 In sum, very few of
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights actually trigger strict scrutiny.93
Nor have burdens on other fundamental rights relating to personhood
and dignity, including the right to vote, the right to marry, and the right to
privacy, generally given rise to strict scrutiny.94 With regard to privacy
rights rooted in the Due Process Clause, only Roe v. Wade recognized a
fundamental right that, at least initially, involved a strict scrutiny standard.95
This specific aspect of Roe was later overruled in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which substituted the “undue burden” standard for strict scrutiny and
did not explicitly characterize the right to abortion as “fundamental.”96
“Incidental” burdens on these and other fundamental rights receive either a
lower level of scrutiny or in some cases none at all.97 Finally, certain classes
of claimants, including convicted felons, can have their fundamental rights
burdened or denied altogether under a form of rationality review.98
As some commentators have observed, the myth that strict scrutiny
applies in the case of fundamental rights is rhetorically useful. For instance,
as James Fleming and Linda McClain have argued, it has been used by
opponents of substantive due process to discourage recognition and
protection for fundamental privacy and autonomy rights.99 Today, the strict
scrutiny myth is being used by proponents of gun rights, who are demanding
that burdens on such rights be treated with a “first-class” strict scrutiny
standard rather than some watered-down “second-class” level of judicial
review.100 However, the argument relies on the same debunked myth––that
strict scrutiny applies whenever fundamental constitutional rights are
implicated or burdened.
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 74 Side B
02/26/2019 14:13:21

92. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
93. Winkler, supra note 66, at 233 (noting that “there is no strict scrutiny found in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, Sixth Amendment doctrine, or in the case law emerging from the
incorporated provisions of the Eighth Amendment”).
94. Id. at 236.
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973).
96. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 876 (1993).
97. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175
(1996)
98. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
99. James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights With
Responsibilities and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 862–63 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming &
McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty]. See also JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 267–69 (2013) [hereinafter FLEMING &
MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY].
100. See Fleming & McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty, supra note 99, at 863–64 (discussing
strict scrutiny arguments in Second Amendment context).
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101. See Blocher, supra note 82, at 379 (noting the parallel concerns in the First Amendment
and Second Amendment contexts).
102. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 191–92.
105. Id. at 197–98.

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 75 Side A

The Second Amendment’s relationship to strict scrutiny remains
unclear. Heller made clear that the right to keep and bear arms was, like
other fundamental rights, not an absolute guarantee. However, it recognized
that the core right of self-defense was to be preserved. As we will see, some
lower courts have interpreted this to mean that burdens on the “core” of the
Second Amendment right are subject to strict scrutiny. What about other
burdens? Heller expressly rejected a general “interest balancing” approach,
but also did not assign any standard of scrutiny to be applied in Second
Amendment cases.
The Court’s rejection of interest balancing is in tension with its strong
reliance on the First Amendment’s free speech right, application of which
frequently involves that very methodology.101 Thus, if lower courts are
applying standards of review that invite interest balancing, have they really
conceived of the Second Amendment as less than “fundamental” relative to
rights like the freedom of speech?
As free speech doctrines show, interest balancing may be consistent
with fundamentality. Professor Dworkin, who characterized fundamental
rights as “trumps,” did not rule out some balancing. Indeed, he expressly
disagreed with the position “that the State is never justified in overriding [a
fundamental] right.”102 Dworkin conceded that the government might
override a fundamental right “when necessary to protect the rights of others,
or to prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major public
benefit.”103 What the government cannot do, he asserted, is override such a
right “on the minimal grounds that would be sufficient if no such right
existed.”104 Thus, Dworkin appeared to allow for both limiting constructions
of fundamental constitutional rights and, in some cases, the balancing of
collective interests against moral claims of right.
What “trumps” appear to do, in the case of fundamental rights, is to
increase the government’s burden for overriding the right. In other words,
fundamentality provides a form of special protection for, or extra weighting
of, particular rights. Once a right qualifies as “fundamental,” a priority is
established in its favor and competing collective interests are generally
required to yield.105 This conception of fundamentality suggests that the
degree of special protection or weight does not have to be uniform. Thus,
rights can be characterized as “stronger” or “weaker,” depending on the
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justifications deemed sufficient to override them. As one commentator
explains, “courts employ a host of standards and categorical rules in
fundamental rights cases, with strict scrutiny only used from time to time.”106
As discussed further below, this accurately describes the current system
of fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution. Heller and McDonald
adopted this general understanding of fundamentality. The decisions
recognized a non-absolute individual right to keep and bear arms. They
characterized a number of restrictions on the right as “presumptively
lawful.”107 Although both Heller and McDonald disclaim interest balancing,
the Court recognized some exceptions to Second Amendment coverage.
These appear to be based, in part, on a weighing of interests. For example,
the presence of firearms in “sensitive places” is presumably not only an
historical anomaly, but also a public safety hazard.

III. Second Amendment Enforcement

A. Qualitative Studies
The Second Amendment’s power and influence as a constitutional right
extends beyond the courtroom.
Legislatures that support Second

02/26/2019 14:13:21

106. Winkler, supra note 66, at 239. As Professor Winkler observes, “the old adage about
laws infringing fundamental rights being subject to strict scrutiny remains a favorite of scholars,
judges, and law students. And it is flatly wrong . . . It is time the fundamental truth be told: laws
infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, but only some of those rights, only
some of the time, and only when challenged by some people.” Id.
107. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 n.26 (2008).
108. See Re, supra note 12, at 962 (“But even if lower courts have not adhered to the best
reading of Heller, they have interpreted the decision reasonably.”).
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Part II addressed some conceptual and definitional claims concerning
the status of the Second Amendment. However, many “second-class” claims
focus in particular on how the Second Amendment has been enforced in the
lower courts and, to a lesser degree, by the Supreme Court. Although it does
not definitively refute underenforcement claims, a systematic review of the
available evidence shows that the Second Amendment has been enforced in
a manner commensurate with its status as a fundamental constitutional right.
This conclusion applies, in particular, to the doctrines and standards used in
Second Amendment cases. Although the low success rate of Second
Amendment claims raises underenforcement concerns, it does not
demonstrate that the right to keep and bear arms is being disfavored,
discriminated against, or actively resisted by the lower courts. Indeed, it is
just as plausible to assert that lower courts have interpreted Heller’s various
lacunae reasonably.108
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109. See Re, supra note 12, at 962 (“Much as an ambiguous statute amounts to a lawmaking
delegation to executive agencies, Heller effectively delegated interpretive power to the lower
courts.”) (footnote omitted).
110. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6.
111. See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 196 (concluding based on qualitative assessment
that some lower courts are misapplying Heller and, in certain contexts, under-enforcing the Second
Amendment); Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37 (arguing that lower courts are “undercutting . . .
Supreme Court precedent” in a way that is suggestive of “something other than a desire to control
crime”); O’Shea, supra note 36, at 1425 (characterizing the “tenor” of lower court Second
Amendment decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to claims that the Second
Amendment limits government action”);
112. Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37.
113. Id. at 30–31.
114. Id. at 31–32.
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Amendment rights do not pass laws restricting the right to keep and bear
arms. Indeed, many have enacted significant protections that go beyond
what Heller suggests. Thus, in assessing its enforcement, it is somewhat
artificial to focus solely on how the Second Amendment has fared in the
courts. Nevertheless, many “second-class” critics have complained
specifically about this particular aspect of Second Amendment enforcement.
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited the actual substance of the
Second Amendment right since Heller, it has fallen to the lower courts to
construct the constitutional rules and doctrines that govern the regulation of
firearms in the United States.109 During the past decade, courts have decided
more than one thousand cases involving Second Amendment rights.110 We
now have both qualitative and quantitative evidence bearing on the “secondclass” enforcement issue. This Section provides a critical review of the
available qualitative literature, while the next Section focuses on existing
quantitative studies.
Qualitative analyses generally conclude that lower courts have enforced
the Second Amendment in a manner that reflects a “second-class” status.111
Some of those analyses have been impressionistic, thus providing relatively
weak or thin evidence of “second-class” enforcement. Others have been
more holistic and detailed, but still fall short of demonstrating significant
deviations in terms of fundamental rights doctrines and standards.
One study concludes, based on a brief review of only three federal
courts of appeals cases involving challenges to public carry laws, that courts
are under-enforcing the Second Amendment.112 The authors identify two
cases upholding, and one case invalidating, such restrictions.113 Heller did
not explicitly address public carry regulations. Nevertheless, the authors
characterize one of the decisions as “defiant,” in part owing to its application
of an intermediate standard of scrutiny (which the authors view as closely
resembling rational basis review in application).114 While one can certainly
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115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37, at 30.
O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1384.
Id. at 1411–12. See Sager, supra note 20, at 1239–40.
O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1413–14.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (2001) (describing a method of deciding cases narrowly and/or shallowly).
120. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (emphasizing that in its
“first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field”).
121. Re, supra note 12, at 962.
122. O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1414.
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criticize some public carry decisions as incorrect applications of Heller or
complain about the degree of judicial scrutiny, evidence from just three
decisions hardly supports the conclusion that courts have “outright defied
decades of fundamental-right jurisprudence.”115
Examining the first half-decade of post-Heller decisions in the lower
federal courts, Michael O’Shea perceives some “genuine threats to the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”116 Despite Heller and
McDonald, O’Shea argues, evidence shows that the Second Amendment is
being treated as an “underenforced constitutional norm”—a right that
courts, primarily for institutional reasons, have declined to fully enforce.117
O’Shea presents evidence that lower courts are concerned about
reaching beyond what Heller expressly holds. Some courts have openly
expressed concerns about the potential social costs of judicial errors with
regard to misinterpreting Heller—in particular, the potential for violence.118
However, it is not clear that expressing these concerns demonstrates
widespread institutional underenforcement. Indeed, the concerns expressed
might just as plausibly be characterized as resting on traditional principles of
judicial restraint or minimalism.119 Heller recognized a right to keep and
bear arms and identified its “core,” but it did not purport to exhaustively
define the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, it expressly
disclaimed any intention to do so.120 In light of the under-defined and undertheorized right, some courts have proceeded with caution in adjudicating
claims that extend beyond the apparent core. As Richard Re has observed,
although Heller has indeed been “narrowed-from-below,” judged by
standard methods of “vertical stare decisis,” lower court treatments of the
decision have been reasonable and defensible.121
Perhaps this is why Professor O’Shea’s “second-class” enforcement
claim seems to be based less on institutional underenforcement arguments
than on what he refers to as the “tenor” and “orientation” of the lower courts
“in prominent cases.”122 Even in this respect, however, the evidence of
underenforcement is thin.
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See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1471–86 (discussing various types of claims).
O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1419–20.
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124.
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Summarizing only “prominent” federal court decisions, and only “at a
general level,” O’Shea identifies certain contexts, including restrictions on
open carry outside the home, in which he claims courts have not properly
enforced the Second Amendment. However, of the five decisions in this
context that he discusses, two that initially upheld restrictions on open carry
were reversed on appeal. Of the five additional decisions O’Shea analyzes,
which upheld other restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms, one of
those was later reversed on appeal. Even assuming all of these decisions
were correctly characterized as “prominent” (for instance, one case involved
a challenge to a registration fee), this means that a total of seven federal court
decisions upheld firearms regulations of various sorts.
O’Shea’s study does not consider the holdings or “tenor” of Second
Amendment claims in cases that he does not deem “prominent.” It seems
likely that in some, or perhaps even many, of those cases the restrictions were
upheld pursuant to one of Heller’s categorical exemptions (for example,
felon dispossession) or perhaps did not raise a significant Second
Amendment issue.123 Further, the O’Shea study shows that in the first five
years after Heller, five lower courts did invalidate firearms regulations.124
This means that in total, the study identified seven “prominent” cases in
which federal courts upheld firearms restrictions, and five decisions in which
courts invalidated them. As discussed further below, tallying judicial
dispositions cannot tell us whether the Second Amendment is being
appropriately enforced. However, if we are keeping score, even in the most
“prominent” cases the results do not indicate “genuine threats” to the Second
Amendment.
This analysis does not suggest that decisions in O’Shea’s study indicate
a robust or enthusiastic judicial embrace of the Second Amendment. Some
lower courts have arguably misinterpreted or misapplied Heller. Of course,
that also happens outside the Second Amendment context. In some cases,
courts have expressed reservations about interpreting the right to keep and
bear arms such that it applies in non-sensitive public places or includes a
right to keep and bear assault-style weapons. However, these concerns did
not always result in the refusal to recognize or enforce Second Amendment
rights. Moreover, as suggested earlier, courts may have proceeded with
caution not out of any hostility to or bias against the Second Amendment,
but rather out of concerns relating to extension of a unique fundamental right
whose exercise may result in the use of offensive or defensive deadly force.
Reasonable readers of the “prominent” decisions in O’Shea’s study can
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125. O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1425.
126. Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9.
127. See id. at 274–75 (discussing choice of level of scrutiny).
128. See id. at 212–14 (describing two-part test).
129. See id. at 265 (discussing Third Circuit’s treatment of Second Amendment rights outside
the home); id. at 268 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s analysis of right to concealed carry outside the
home); id. at 288–96 (criticizing Second Circuit’s approach to Second Amendment claims, which
only applies heightened scrutiny to “substantial burdens” on Second Amendment rights).
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disagree about whether their “tenor” was pragmatic or minimalistic, as
opposed to “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile” to the Second
Amendment.125
Finally, two collaborators read all of the Second Amendment decisions
from the federal courts of appeals during the first 8 years post-Heller.126
Their general descriptions of appeals court decisions suggest that the right to
keep and bear arms is being enforced in a manner similar to—in fact, in
many circuits is being modeled upon—the First Amendment free speech
right.127 Thus, the study shows that federal appeals courts have generally
adopted a two-part test to adjudicate Second Amendment claims, with robust
protection provided at the core of the right and lesser but still significant
protection outside that domain.128 On its face, at least, this sort of doctrinal
framework is familiar to fundamental rights adjudication.
To be sure, the study takes issue with the interpretation of Heller, and
the Second Amendment more generally, in a few circuits and with respect to
certain types of regulations—particularly limits on firearms outside the
home (again, an issue neither Heller nor McDonald explicitly address).129
However, the study does not describe a fundamental right that is routinely
being subjected to rational basis or other non-fundamental rights standards.
Although it suggests some difficulty in the lower courts in terms of parsing
Heller and determining the Second Amendment’s boundaries, it does not
demonstrate that the Second Amendment is being treated as a “second-class”
or non-fundamental right.
The qualitative studies suffer from various deficiencies. Some are
based on such a small sample of cases that they provide only impressionistic
data. Others review a subset of cases—“prominent” ones, for example—
without taking into account the broader landscape of Second Amendment
litigation. Still others have broader coverage in terms of sample size, but
highlight what seem to be outlier examples of alleged misinterpretation or
doctrinal deviation. The studies leave out a lot of litigation, most notably at
the state level. Finally, none of the qualitative studies offers any comparative
benchmark by which to measure enforcement of the Second Amendment.
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B. Quantitative Studies
Scholars have begun to produce significant empirical evidence
concerning Second Amendment claims. Eric Ruben and Joseph Blocher
have published an empirical study of the thousand-plus lower court decisions
(state and federal, trial and appellate) handed down since Heller.130 The
authors do not purport to resolve whether Second Amendment enforcement
has been “second-class” in any normative sense.131 However, several of their
conclusions do tend to refute, or at least raise significant doubts concerning,
claims that courts have subjected the Second Amendment to disfavored
treatment.
“Second-class” arguments frequently begin, and not infrequently end,
by pointing to the very low success rate of Second Amendment claims. As
Ruben and Blocher acknowledge, “the vast majority of Second Amendment
claims fail. Of the 1,153 Second Amendment challenges in the database,
only 108 were not rejected, for an overall success rate of 9 percent.”132 But
they argue that the low success rate “does not show that the right is being
underenforced.”133 Instead, the authors conclude that the data “shows that
the low rate of success probably has more to do with the claims being
asserted than with judicial hostility to the right.”134
Nearly a quarter of the challenges, they note, were to felon-inpossession laws and all but one percent of such challenges failed.135 Indeed,
the authors write, “a clear majority of the challenges—742 of 1,153—arose
in criminal cases, in which defense counsel might be expected to raise any
nonsanctionable defense. The low rate of success in those cases (six percent)
and the 126 cases involving pro se litigants (two percent) pulls down the
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 78 Side A
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130. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6.
131. See id. at 1449 (“To be clear, these arguments are not purely empirical. Saying that a right
is systematically underenforced involves at least two steps: a conclusion about how stringently it
should be enforced, and an assessment of how it actually is enforced in practice. Parties in the gun
debate disagree about both of these things, but our focus in this Article is the latter.”).
132. Id. at 1472.
133. Id. at 1507.
134. Id. But see Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment a SecondClass Right? (NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 18-43),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247773 (draft on file with author); id. at
105–06 n. 16 (“Given the plausible causation theories and limited information, however, we are
not quite ready to agree that [Ruben & Blocher’s data] ‘shows that the low rates of success [for
Second Amendment claims] probably has more to do with the claims being asserted than with
judicial hostility to the right.’”).
135. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507.
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success rate as a whole.”136 As other commentators have observed, these
kinds of claims “are, bluntly speaking, outstanding losers.”137
Ruben and Blocher also find that “[t]he success rate of Second
Amendment claims is highly correlated with who makes them, and whether
and how they are represented.”138 They report that “civil litigants succeeded
two and half times more often than criminal defendants,” while civil
plaintiffs with legal representation “had a success rate of 40 percent in the
federal appellate courts.”139 The authors attribute these success rates to case
selection: “civil attorneys are selecting better cases to litigate.”140
Other empirical studies cast doubt on the significance of the success
rate in Second Amendment cases. Professors Samaha and Germano, who
have focused in particular on the influence of judicial ideology in Second
Amendment, free speech, and other constitutional cases, make three points
that are salient to this form of “second-class” enforcement claim.
First, they note that comparisons across constitutional or litigation areas
raise distinctive conceptual and other challenges.141 Even accepting that
success rates are a valid benchmark of comparison, Samaha and Germano
observe, this does not mean that “equalization of success rates is justified.”142
“Standing alone,” they write, “differences do not prove that judges are
erring.”143 Second, even granting that success rates are a valid point of
comparison, the Second Amendment’s low success rate does not set it apart
from other rights and constitutional provisions.144 Third, as Samaha and
Germano note, “last place doesn’t necessarily mean second class.”145
Ruben and Blocher’s study also sheds some light on other aspects of
“second-class” enforcement claims. Unsurprisingly, their data suggest that
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 78 Side B
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136. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507.
137. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 860.
138. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1509.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 104–05 (noting complications in comparing
success rates across fields of litigation).
142. Id. at 112.
143. Id. This is at least a partial response to the argument that under “heightened” levels of
judicial scrutiny in other areas, constitutional rights claims are highly successful. See George
Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 DUKE L.J.
41, 52–53 (2018) (suggesting that success rates in Second Amendment cases ought to be compared
to other claims subject to heightened scrutiny).
144. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WILL. & MARY L. REV. 35, 58 (2016) (reporting low success rates for regulatory takings claims in
state courts); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 428–29 (2012) (reporting low
success rates for certain Fourth Amendment claims).
145. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 112.

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 79 Side A

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ZICK_UPDATED TO PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2019]

2/25/2019 1:24 PM

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

651

02/26/2019 14:13:21

146. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1488.
147. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 872 (finding positive and statistically
significant Supreme Court case score in gun rights cases).
148. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1499.
149. Id. at 1499–1500.
150. As Ruben and Blocher observe:
In 94 percent of the successful challenges where the court found that the burden
was not on the core of the right, the court applied intermediate, as opposed to strict,
scrutiny. Meanwhile, courts applied intermediate scrutiny only 14 percent of the
time when a burden did fall on the core of the right. Otherwise, the court applied
strict scrutiny (29 percent) or, more commonly, granted relief without making clear
what standard the court was applying (57 percent).
Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6 at 1499–1500.
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lower courts have paid close attention to Heller’s recognition of Second
Amendment limitations and exemptions. Indeed, they note, Heller’s
discussion of “presumptively lawful” regulations was relied upon in 60
percent of the challenges in the study.146 Other empirical work confirms that
the lower courts are indeed paying very close attention to what Heller said.147
Thus, a mere tally of Second Amendment wins and losses does not
establish “second-class” enforcement. As Ruben and Blocher show, the
success rate does not take into consideration the nature of the claims pursued,
the identity of the challengers, the courts and court systems in which their
claims are adjudicated, and many other important variables.
Evidence from the Ruben and Blocher study also supports Part II’s
argument that the Second Amendment, as enforced, has been conceptualized
as a “fundamental” constitutional right. For example, their review of the
data “suggests that, within successful challenges, where the court finds that
a law infringes on the “core” or “central component” of the right, the burden
on the government increases.”148
Further, the Ruben and Blocher study shows that just as they have in
the case of other fundamental rights, courts have applied varying levels or
degrees of scrutiny to regulations of Second Amendment rights—and
sometimes, again as in other constitutional areas, have failed to identify any
specific standard of scrutiny.149 Further, Ruben and Blocher conclude that
burdens on the “core” of the Second Amendment right have consistently
been subject to strict scrutiny, while other burdens have received either
intermediate scrutiny or have been invalidated without specification of a
specific standard.150 All of this is wholly consistent with judicial
enforcement of fundamental rights.
As additional evidence of fundamental conception and enforcement,
Ruben and Blocher’s data show that in some courts a tiered scrutiny regime
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151. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1494.
152. Id. at 1496.
153. Id.
154. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1496.
155. See infra Part IV.B.
156. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1497 (“Within federal courts of appeals, about 96
percent of successes came out of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—far higher
than the 54 percent (119 of 219) of Second Amendment cases heard by those circuits.”).
157. Id.
158. See David B. Kopel, Data Indicate Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J.
79 (2018); Mocsary, supra note 143. The critics also make more granular empirical claims about
the manner in which the authors collected and coded decisions in Second Amendment cases.
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has begun to emerge.151 Their study shows that intermediate scrutiny “has
been the most prevalent form of scrutiny,” with federal appellate courts
applying that standard 79 percent of the time, federal district courts doing so
74 percent of the time, and state appellate courts applying intermediate
scrutiny 68 percent of the time.152 Moreover, the authors concluded that
“[c]ontrary to the common assertion, application of intermediate scrutiny has
not invariably been fatal to Second Amendment claims.”153 At the same
time, they concluded that although strict scrutiny resulted in a higher rate of
invalidation of firearms regulations, “strict scrutiny was far from fatal to
challenged weapons laws.”154 As discussed further in Part IV, the seeming
breakdown of tiered scrutiny is not unusual.155 Indeed, it has become
increasingly common across a range of fundamental rights.
Finally, Ruben and Blocher’s data examine cross-circuit disparities in
terms of the success of Second Amendment claims. The authors found a
federal circuit disparity, but they attributed it largely to the fact that only a
few states, located in certain circuits, had enacted the kind of strict gun
control laws that were likely to be invalidated.156 Thus, Ruben and Blocher
conclude: “The relatively high proportion of successes in the Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is consistent with the view that these courts
are not in open rebellion against the Second Amendment.”157 Indeed,
although one cannot really quantify class-based “second-class” claims, these
results certainly suggest that “elite” circuits are not overtly unfriendly to
Second Amendment claims.
Critics of the Ruben and Blocher study insist that the data do not support
the claim that the Second Amendment is being properly enforced.158
However, they do not provide a baseline from which to determine whether
the right to keep and bear arms is actually being “underenforced.”
Consequently, the critiques suffer from the same general infirmity as other
“second class” enforcement claims. For example, although Heller does not
resolve the issue, some critics of the Ruben and Blocher study assume a
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C. Judicial Ideology
Some studies have also attempted to isolate and assess the extent to
which judicial ideology has affected Second Amendment enforcement.
Although this factor cannot be ruled out, the existing data do not demonstrate

02/26/2019 14:13:21

159. E.g., Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 9–10 (critiquing circuit court decisions on this
ground).
160. See Mocsary, supra note 143, at 42–43.
161. See Re, supra note 12, at 963–64 (citing examples of lower court criticisms of Supreme
Court decisions concerning the right of habeas corpus).
162. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507 (“The doctrinal landscape is more diverse,
nuanced, and interesting than many suppose.”).
163. Id.
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“correct” answer to the scope of public carry rights and then fault lower
courts for not enforcing their preferred interpretation.159 Others do not
contest the data itself, but suggest that judges are hiding or masking their
hostility to Second Amendment rights and defying Heller.160 But of course,
such claims are not falsifiable. In any event, lower courts are not always shy
about indicating explicit disagreements with Supreme Court precedents.161
Thus, if there is open judicial hostility to Heller, we might expect to see it
more transparently expressed.
Like the available qualitative data, quantitative data do not paint a
picture of a disrespected right or courts engaged in massive resistance to
Heller or the Second Amendment. The individual right to keep and bear
arms, as enforced in lower courts, exhibits traits that are common to the
broader class of fundamental rights. The Second Amendment that has
emerged is non-absolute and subject to specific and perhaps additional
coverage exceptions. Courts have generally applied either strict or
intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment burdens. Ruben and Blocher’s
data suggest that the right to keep and bear arms is nuanced and variable.162
The Second Amendment can be a strong trump, in the sense that it prevents
government from regulating the right to keep and bear arms in certain
circumstances. This occurs, as one would expect, when the core of the
Second Amendment right is implicated. And when that occurs, the
government’s burden of justification generally increases.
These are all familiar attributes of fundamental constitutional rights.
The data depict a Second Amendment that is becoming normalized,
“legalistic,” and methodologically nuanced.163 The right to keep and bear
arms is being assimilated, sometimes more slowly than its proponents would
like, into the family of fundamental constitutional rights.
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164. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1443–1447.
165. Id. at 1444.
166. Id. at 1501. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
167. O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1423.
168. Id.
169. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 111–12 (noting that while there is an
ideological effect, its causes are not clear).
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that ideology or preference exert a strong influence on outcomes in Second
Amendment cases.
Professor O’Shea’s study, which was discussed earlier, examined the
political party of the judges who wrote Second Amendment opinions during
the five-year study period.164 O’Shea identified what he described as “a
profound partisan divide,” with Democrat-appointed judges almost
uniformly upholding firearms regulations and Republican-appointed judges
voting to invalidate them.165 Like other commentators, Professor O’Shea
fails to consider that Heller and other pro-firearms decisions might also be
characterized as the result of judicial partisanship. In the world of “secondclass” claims, partisanship seems to explain only the losses, and not the wins,
of firearms proponents.
In any event, Professor O’Shea highlighted some significant caveats.
For example, he acknowledged that “a fair number” of the cases involved
claims by convicted felons, which again Heller essentially foreclosed. This
significantly reduced the probative value of these decisions.166 O’Shea also
acknowledged that Republican-appointed judges “have authored many
important opinions rejecting plausible Second Amendment claims or
expressing skepticism about broadened Second Amendment rights.”167
Professor O’Shea was not attempting to demonstrate a statistically
significant ideological effect. More modestly, he concluded based on his
study that “judges selected by Republican presidents occasionally held that
government action violates the Second Amendment while judges selected by
Democratic presidents essentially never did so.”168 However, as Professor
O’Shea seems to acknowledge, that is not a valid empirical demonstration of
partisan or ideological bias.
Indeed, the real problem, as empiricists have observed, lies in isolating
the various factors––in addition to judicial ideology––which might lead to
such results. Thus far, more rigorous quantitative studies have failed to
reveal any “profound partisan divide.” Although the data show that Second
Amendment claims lag behind other types of constitutional claims in terms
of attracting votes from Democrat-appointed judges, they do not isolate
ideology or preference in a strong causal sense.169
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In a study that compares various constitutional claims, including
abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights, Professors Samaha and
Germano observe that judicial ideology appears to play a relatively minor
role in terms of explaining Second Amendment case outcomes.170
Specifically, they conclude that “the variable identifying judges as
Democratic or Republican appointees is not a statistically significant
predictor in gun rights cases.”171
Samaha and Germano reach a similar conclusion in a follow-up study
focusing on the same constitutional areas, but this time limiting their study
of the Second Amendment to civil claims.172 The authors conclude that while
judicial ideology may contribute to the disparities in success rates across
constitutional claims, they “cannot make much progress on why gun rights
claims might fare worse than certain other claims.”173 They observe that
“plausible explanations are available that have nothing to do with judges
disliking gun rights, and existing data cannot rule out those alternatives.”174
They conclude that in comparative claims studies like their own, “finding

02/26/2019 14:13:21

Among the possibilities worth considering are stakes and resources. Perhaps, for
example, the litigation arm of the gun rights movement is generally better financed
than other constitutional litigation shops, and can afford to litigate claims that are
unlikely to prevail. And perhaps a high fraction of litigation losses are tolerable for
this class of litigants because persistent litigation maintains high expected costs for
regulators who otherwise would like to innovate with new gun policies—and
perhaps litigation losses can be used to promote the cause to gun owners, who may
be reminded that judges are not willing to establish their preferred gun policies and
who may then increase their material support for the broader cause. Or perhaps gun
rights claimants and lawyers are relatively more committed to their cause, are less
influenced by a global litigation plan of some organizing body, and are not dissuaded
by judicial rejection. But again, the factors that might make gun rights litigation
special will have to be explored in future work.
Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 860–61, n.176.
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170. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 861 (concluding that “the summary statistics
indicate that commercial speech claims are like gun rights claims in that ideology might play a
small role, while ideology might play a large role in abortion rights, establishment clause, and antiaffirmative action claims”). (The authors caution that, in part owing to the prevalence of criminal
claims in the database, “judicial support for gun rights claims is so terribly low that this field of
litigation might not be amenable to grouping with other claims.”).
171. Id. at 865.
172. Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 106–07. (As the authors note, the high number
of criminal cases in the Second Amendment database may skew success rates, owing to the actions
of appointed counsel who may “adopt implausible legal positions when facing serious penalties.”)
173. Id. at 103.
174. Id. With regard to the low success rate of Second Amendment claims, Professors Samaha
and Germano surmise as follows:
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distinctive voting patterns among Democratic and Republican appointees is
closer to the beginning of the investigation than the end.”175
Nor has evidence of “elite” or professional bias materialized. As noted
earlier, both pre- and post-Heller, some commentators have asserted that
such bias causes courts to view and treat Second Amendment claims and
claimants as “second-class.”176 However, these claims have not been backed
by actual evidence. Moreover, some of the complaints have been directed
solely at federal appellate judges. That leaves the puzzle of why Second
Amendment claims frequently fail in state courts as well, where presumably
the same professional and elite biases do not exist or are at least less
pronounced. Such impressionistic “second-class” claims provide little in the
way of actual evidence that the Second Amendment has been forsaken or
disrespected by judges owing to their attitudinal biases.
In sum, quantitative studies have not produced any convincing evidence
that the Second Amendment is being under-enforced by lower courts, much
less that it is the object of resistance or rebellion. The data cannot rule out
that some courts may be hostile to or biased against Second Amendment
claims. However, the burden properly lies with those who would point to
mere impressions, attitudinal factors, or the general “tenor” of decisions to
demonstrate that the Second Amendment has been under-enforced.

IV. The Second Amendment’s Comparative Status

Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 112.
See O’Shea, supra note 37.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

175.
176.
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One of the central premises of “second-class” arguments is that the
Second Amendment has not been treated with the respect and regard
accorded other fundamental constitutional rights. This is evident, critics
complain, in terms of the standards applied to Second Amendment claims,
the relative degree of enforcement of the right to keep and bear arms, and the
overall treatment of Second Amendment claims in lower courts and the
Supreme Court. As noted earlier, comparative assessments across a range of
constitutional rights raise special difficulties. However, in the broad terms
“second-class” critics typically adopt, it is possible to subject comparative
claims to some meaningful scrutiny. Four general conclusions follow: (1)
the notion that all rights are created equal is false; (2) insofar as we have a
hierarchy of fundamental rights, the Second Amendment sits closer to its top
than to its cellar; (3) substantive comparisons to other rights in the same
class, including the freedom of speech, do not establish the Second
Amendment’s “second-class” status; and (4) judged relative to other
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fundamental constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has not “orphaned” or
abandoned the Second Amendment.

A. The Fallacy of Equality and the Hierarchy of Fundamental
Rights

02/26/2019 14:13:21

177. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
178. Miller, supra note 19.
179. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (describing framework for
application of heightened judicial scrutiny).
180. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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“Second-class” claims are based, in part, on the notion that there is, or
at least ought to be, no hierarchy of rights under our Constitution. The
Second Amendment, the argument goes, is entitled to the same status,
standards, and enforcement as other recognized constitutional rights. And
since all constitutional rights are created equal, it is wrong to subject any of
them to differential treatment. Simply put, to borrow a phrase from the first
Justice Harlan, with regard to constitutional rights “there is no caste here.”177
The trouble with this form of the “second-class” argument is that it is
“demonstrably false.”178 Not all constitutional rights are created equal––a
fact demonstrated, ironically, by the very concept of “fundamental” rights.
Not even all of rights in the sub-class of “fundamental” rights enjoy
equal status. That is because fundamental constitutional rights have long
been explicitly and implicitly ranked. For instance, as noted earlier, within
the class of fundamental rights, incorporated rights are “fundamental” in a
special sense: By virtue of their unique status, these rights enjoy broader
scope and enforcement than the sub-class of “second-class” un-incorporated
rights. Since the 1930s, economic rights have been disfavored vis-à-vis noneconomic rights.179 Moreover, some consider the class of enumerated
fundamental rights––those explicitly set forth in the text, as in the Bill of
Rights––to be more legitimate than the class of “un-enumerated”
fundamental rights that includes the right to abortion and other “privacy”
rights.180
These distinctions are all familiar to constitutional jurisprudence and
theory. With respect to each distinction, the Second Amendment is clearly
on the “preferred” side of the line. It is an incorporated, non-economic, and
textually explicit constitutional right. Insofar as there are “classes” of
constitutional rights, the Second Amendment possesses all of the basic
hallmarks of a “first-class” right.
Public discourse about fundamental rights demonstrates the existence
of a hierarchy and, again, confirms the Second Amendment’s high rank
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B. Within-Class Status
Some “second-class” claimants might accept the foregoing general
premises, yet still argue that the Second Amendment has been disfavored or
disrespected relative to other fundamental rights in its class. One prominent
version of this argument is that relative to other rights in the class, courts
have framed the Second Amendment differently or subjected it to less
favorable standards.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
413 U.S. 149 (1973).
Miller, supra note 19.
Id.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

181.
182.
183.
184.
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within that hierarchy. As Professor Miller notes, the decisions in Roe v.
Wade181 and Colgrove v. Battin182 were both handed down in 1973.
Although both are significant decisions in terms of fundamental rights, most
Americans could not pick Colgrove out of a precedential lineup. (The
decision held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a twelve-member
jury in civil cases.). Professor Miller observes: “I have yet to see cable news
pundits lament the demise of the twelve-member jury, or read of a Twitter
war raging over the meaning of ‘in suits at common law . . . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved’ or learn of grass-roots mobilization to restore the
original understanding of the Seventh Amendment.”183
In terms of public recognition and political salience, Heller and the
Second Amendment are much closer to Roe and the abortion right than to
Colgrove and the jury trial right. As mentioned earlier, Heller and the
Second Amendment have fundamentally altered public discourse about gun
control. Public and legislative support for gun rights is very high, in both
real and relative terms. If there were a Rodney Dangerfield Award, the Third
Amendment, which has been ignored by the Supreme Court and is one of the
few un-incorporated rights in the Bill of Rights, would be a solid contender.
However, the Second Amendment, which has the sustained attention of
courts, officials, and the public, would not even be in the running.
A relatively short list of constitutional rights tends to dominate the field.
Professor Miller sums things up: “Free speech, the right to keep and bear
arms, equal protection, due process, privacy––these are the sexy rights.
Everything else is B-list.”184 One might round out this list with a few other
rights, including the right to vote and the free exercise of religion, both of
which can also make a plausible claim to “A-list” status. However, Professor
Miller is surely correct about two things: the fundamental rights “A-list” is
short, and the Second Amendment is definitely on it.
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185. See Miller, supra note 19 (suggesting that “the tiers of scrutiny are crumbling for every
right”).
186. Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 144 (2016).
187. Miller, supra note 19.
188. Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
189. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying
heightened scrutiny to local ordinances that singled out religious rituals).
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Part III offered a partial answer to this concern, in terms of judicial
enforcement of the Second Amendment. The data suggest that Second
Amendment claims are being assimilated into the family of fundamental
constitutional rights. Thus, familiar standards and frameworks, including the
concept of “tiered” scrutiny, have now developed in the Second Amendment
area as they have in other fundamental rights contexts.
From this perspective, the real problem that gun control opponents have
encountered is not that their claims are being treated differently by courts,
but rather that they are being normalized within a fundamental rights
doctrine that has long exhibited ambiguities and inconsistencies. For
example, one common “second-class” complaint has been that courts are not
consistently applying “heightened scrutiny” to gun control measures.
However, as scholars have observed, the tiered scrutiny regime has not held
up across a range of fundamental constitutional rights.185 As Jamal Greene
has noted, “[e]ach particular fundamental right . . . bears its own bespoke
doctrinal formula.”186 This reality significantly complicates arguments that
a particular fundamental right is being disfavored relative to other members
of the class. As Professor Miller has observed, “[n]o right can be an outlier
if every right is in a class by itself.”187
Insofar as fundamental constitutional rights are concerned, there is no
mandatory script or set of magic words we can look for in assessing their
relative strength or status. As discussed in Part II, strict scrutiny has never
been a reliable indicator of fundamentality. Thus, its absence in most Second
Amendment cases does not demonstrate differential or unequal treatment.
Indeed, standards and frameworks applied to other fundamental rights
generally undermine arguments about the Second Amendment’s disfavored
treatment. Thus, even “substantial” burdens on the free exercise of religion
are permissible, so long as they result from application of laws or regulations
that are “neutral and generally applicable.”188 Strict scrutiny is reserved for
laws that purposefully target or discriminate against religion.189 Since 1992,
abortion rights have been governed by an “undue burden” standard that
grants government broad power to regulate most aspects of abortion and
prohibits only laws that have the purpose or effect of denying women’s
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access to abortion services.190 Some recent Due Process Clause “privacy”
cases do not explicitly adopt any particular standard of scrutiny.191 When
judged according to the standard of scrutiny applied, lower courts have
treated Second Amendment claims at least as favorably––and in some cases
arguably more favorably––than these other fundamental rights claims.
As these examples also show, fundamental rights are not always the
strong trumps that gun rights proponents apparently believe them to be.
Thus, the “fundamental” right to marry is subject to a variety of state and
federal regulations that have not raised any serious constitutional questions.
Despite the fact that the right to vote is fundamental, the Supreme Court has
upheld even lifetime bans on felon voting rights.192 This shows that classes
of individuals sometimes enjoy variable fundamental rights. For example,
with respect to incarcerated persons, the right to vote can be denied, the right
to marry cannot, and freedom of speech can be abridged when it is deemed
reasonably necessary to further legitimate penological interests.193
Within the sub-class of “fundamental” constitutional rights, the Court
has developed a messy milieu of doctrines, standards, and approaches. In
this context, claims of differential treatment are difficult if not impossible to
maintain. Indeed, insofar as Second Amendment decisions are largely using
some form of tiered scrutiny approach, with at least some regulations subject
to fatal forms of scrutiny, the right to keep and bear arms is arguably
receiving more protection than, say, free exercise of religion or the right to
abortion. In sum, if standards of review are suggestive of status, the Second
Amendment is not among the most disfavored rights in the fundamental
rights class.

As discussed earlier, when the Court recognized the individual right to
keep and bear arms in Heller, it repeatedly invoked the Free Speech Clause
as a model or analogy. Freedom of speech is a natural right for “new” rights
to aspire to. No other right displays the same degree of magnetism and
influence––in public discourse, scholarly writing, or judicial decisions––as

02/26/2019 14:13:21

190. Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (upholding
various state regulations on abortion) with Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292
(2016) (invalidating a state effort to severely restrict access to abortion services).
191. See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas sodomy law did
not survive even rationality review); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (failing to
specify standard of review under Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause).
192. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
193. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987).
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C. Freedom of Speech – Then and Now
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the Free Speech Clause.194 Some have warned against analogizing the
Second Amendment to the First Amendment for purposes of constructing
constitutional doctrines.195 However, since “second-class” arguments often
focus on the preferred status of free speech, the comparison is worth
examining. In some important respects, the analogy demonstrates the
opposite of what “second-class” claimants apparently intend. The right to
keep and bear arms and the free speech right share more in common than
“second-class” critics typically acknowledge or seem to realize.

1. The Free Speech Clause’s First Decade

02/26/2019 14:13:21

194. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787–1800 (2004) (discussing
cultural and other aspects of the “magnetism” of the free speech right).
195. See e.g., TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 203–41 (2018); Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking
Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51
(2012).
196. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 254–65 (1886) (upholding ban on armed
paramilitary parades); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding federal gun control
law).
197. See e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211, 216 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
198. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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Between ratification and recognition, both Second Amendment and
First Amendment rights experienced extended periods of jurisprudential
dormancy. In decisions handed down during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the Supreme Court indicated that the right to keep and bear arms
was narrow and perhaps limited to militia service.196 From its ratification in
1791 through the Heller decision in 2008, the Court did not recognize a
fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Similarly, the Court
did not engage with the Free Speech Clause until 1919, when it handed down
a series of famously speech-restrictive decisions.197 Prior to that, the Court
had suggested that freedom of speech and press might prohibit only prior
restraints on expression.198 In their pre-recognition eras, the Court
interpreted the right to keep and bear arms and freedom of speech quite
narrowly.
With regard to the Second Amendment, Heller changed the landscape
dramatically when it recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms.
McDonald, which was handed down shortly thereafter, significantly
expanded the scope of Second Amendment enforcement by placing the right
in the category of “fundamental” rights applicable to the states. These two
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decisions represent an obvious starting point for assessing the right to keep
and bear arms as a “fundamental” right.
In terms of the Free Speech Clause, the point of judicial recognition
arguably occurred not in 1919, when the Court first engaged with the free
speech right, but rather when the Court first signaled that freedom of speech
was “fundamental” in the sense that it applied to the states. This occurred in
1925, in Gitlow v. New York.199 To be sure, in terms of the development of
fundamental rights jurisprudence, Gitlow was decided very early. The Court
did not begin to develop a coherent approach or framework with respect to
“fundamental” rights until more than a decade later.200 Some might argue
that to truly compare apples to apples, the Second Amendment must be
compared to the contemporary Free Speech Clause. That comparison is
discussed below. However, we can still learn something––perhaps a lot––
from a comparison of the two rights in their respective “first decades.” From
the data discussed earlier, we have a sense of how the Second Amendment
has been enforced during its first decade. How did the Supreme Court and
lower courts approach freedom of speech in the first decade after it was
recognized as a “fundamental” constitutional right?
We can begin assessing the free speech analogy by examining the
principal Supreme Court decisions. Heller and Gitlow are very different
decisions, but they also share important things in common. As in Heller, the
Court’s recognition of the free speech right in Gitlow came with some
caveats. In the course of upholding a state law that criminalized
communications advocating the overthrow of government by violent means,
the Court observed:

02/26/2019 14:13:21

199. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press––which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress––are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
200. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
201. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
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It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does
not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without
responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom.201
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Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 667–68.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 670.
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As discussed earlier, Heller makes the same point about the Second
Amendment––i.e., that the right, although fundamental, is not absolute.
Like Heller, Gitlow highlighted some historical and other exceptions to
free speech coverage. Thus, the Court observed that “a State may punish
utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and
threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.”202 Further, it emphasized that
freedom of speech “does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the
attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or
teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or
hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties.”203 So, the free
speech right, like the right to keep and bear arms, was thought to be subject
to longstanding exceptions.
There were also some important differences in how the Court
characterized the rights in Heller and Gitlow. Heller embraced a more robust
conception of Second Amendment rights than the Gitlow Court adopted
concerning freedom of speech. In Gitlow, the Court emphasized that while
freedom of speech is “an inestimable privilege in a free government,”
without limitations, “it might become the scourge of the republic.”204 (It is
impossible to imagine similar words being used in Heller to describe the
Second Amendment). Thus, the Court concluded, the idea that “a State in
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals,
incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question.”205
Like Heller, Gitlow also addressed the nature and scope of judicial
review. Recall that Heller disclaimed “interest balancing” and rational basis
review. By contrast, Gitlow observed that the state’s determination that
certain communications advocating the overthrow of the government ought
to be suppressed was entitled to “great weight,” and indeed that “[e]very
presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute.”206 The
Court wrote: “We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably
infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we must and do sustain its
constitutionality.”207 It reasoned that “[s]uch utterances, by their very nature,
involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They
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208. Id. at 669.
209. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
210. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
211. Id. at 671.
212. I conducted the following Westlaw search: adv: “first amendment” & (speech OR
“freedom #of speech” OR “speech clause” or “first amendment” OR “gitlow v. new york”) & DA
(aft 06-08-1925 & bef 06-08-1935).
213. The search terms captured a large number of Twenty-first Amendment cases, as well as
some cases involving the free exercise of religion.
214. Reuben & Blocher, supra note 6. There are several possible explanations for the
difference. Most prominently, in the 1920s and 1930s, there were no interest groups, much less
entire industries devoted to constitutional litigation. Further, Gitlow clearly emphasized the limited
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threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution.”208 At the outset,
then, Gitlow embraced a form of rationality review for the nominally
“fundamental” free speech right. Now, this was obviously long before the
Court adopted a “tiered” approach to judicial review of burdens on
constitutional rights.209 However, at the outset, fundamentality did not entail
a rigorous form of judicial scrutiny, and indeed allowed government to
restrict speech in furtherance of public safety, order, and other communal
interests.
Far from envisioning a strong trump against governmental speech
regulation, Gitlow held that syndicalism laws could be “applied to every
utterance—not too trivial to be beneath the notice of the law—which is of
such a character and used with such intent and purpose as to bring it within
the prohibition of the statute.”210 Unlike Heller and McDonald, which
recognized self-defense as the core justification for the Second Amendment
right, Gitlow did not even articulate a value that would presumptively
outweigh the state’s interests. Thus, as long as the government had a nonarbitrary basis for concluding that speech posed some danger to public
safety, the Court concluded that governments could criminalize it––even
absent any real showing of “clear and present danger.”211
Gitlow’s framing and conception of the free speech right made it more
likely that the Supreme Court and lower courts would reject most free speech
claims. That is precisely what occurred. I examined all of the reported
federal and state cases (trial and appellate) invoking the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause between 1925 and 1935––in effect, the first decade of
the provision’s post-incorporation enforcement.212 Discarding decisions that
did not significantly implicate or discuss the merits of First Amendment
claims yielded approximately two dozen published opinions.213 The sample
size is obviously small––too small to perform any meaningful empirical
analysis. In comparison, there have been more than one thousand postHeller Second Amendment decisions.214
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Although the sample size is small, it is still revealing. Consider the
Supreme Court’s own review of First Amendment claims in the initial
decade. During the first post-incorporation decade, the Supreme Court
handed down just three free speech decisions215––not quite an “orphaning”
of the right, as Justice Thomas might say, but certainly not far from it.216
One of these cases was Whitney v. California, decided in 1927.217
Whitney involved a challenge to California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act,
which criminalized willfully organizing and becoming a member of a group
assembled to advocate, teach, or aid and abet unlawful acts of force or
terrorism as a means of effecting political change.218 The Court upheld Anita
Whitney’s conviction, even though she denied joining the Communist Labor
Party with intent to aid or abet acts of syndicalism by the group.219
The Court’s analysis consisted of a total of three paragraphs. The first
emphasized that the free speech right “does not confer an absolute right to
speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose” and specifically
does not cover “utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to
crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized
government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means.”220 The second
paragraph declared that the state’s determination that communications and
assemblies furthering syndicalism “must be given great weight,” that
“[e]very presumption must be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute,”
and that the law may not be declared unconstitutional “unless it is an
arbitrary or unreasonable attempt to exercise the authority vested in the State
in the public interest.”221 The third and final paragraph applied these
standards to uphold the application of the syndicalism law to Whitney’s
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 86 Side A
02/26/2019 14:13:21

scope of free speech and press rights. This too likely depressed litigation of First Amendment
claims. By contrast, Professors Reuben ad Blocher found an above-average appeal rate in Second
Amendment cases. Id. at 1474. They surmised that the trend is related, in part, to the overall lack
of success in Second Amendment litigation. Thus, litigants may have brought more Second
Amendment claims “due to uncertainty in the doctrine (whether real or perceived), strongly
motivated or overconfident litigants, or some other reason hard to pin down with our data.” Id. In
the context of what we might call the modern culture of constitutional litigation, which includes
dedicated advocacy and interest groups willing to fund Second Amendment cases, federal and state
reporters have predictably swelled with decisions.
215. The Court also decided a free press case. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713
(1931) (invalidating state law on the ground that it constituted a prior restraint on the press).
216. See infra Part IV.D. (discussing whether the Second Amendment has been “orphaned”
by the Court).
217. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
218. Id. at 359–60.
219. Although the record below indicated that Whitney had not even raised any First
Amendment claim, the Court decided to entertain it on appeal. Id. at 360-61.
220. Id. at 371.
221. Id.
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222. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
223. Id. at 379–80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
224. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927).
225. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
226. Id. at 362.
227. Id. at 361.
228. Id. at 368–69.
229. Id. at 369–70.
230. See State v. Kassay, 126 184 N.E. 521 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1932); State v. Boloff, 7 P.2d 775
(Ore. Sup. Ct. 1932); Carr v. State, 166 S.E. 827 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1932); Comm. v. Goodman, 16 Pa.
D. & C. 253 (1931); Comm. v. Lazar, 103 157 A. 701 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931).
231. See Kassay, 126 N.E. at 525 (stating that Bill of Rights was “not applicable to the states”).
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expressive activities.222 Even Justice Brandeis, who wrote a stirring and
now-famous concurrence extolling the values of freedom of speech,
ultimately concluded that Whitney had effectively waived her First
Amendment claims.223
The Court decided one other syndicalism case during the postincorporation decade. In Fiske v. Kansas, the Court distinguished Gitlow
and Whitney on the ground that the record before it did not contain sufficient
evidence that the Industrial Workers of the World had advocated or taught
the necessity of criminal syndicalism.224 Fiske was a brief, unanimous, and
straightforward application of the Court’s earlier syndicalism precedents.
The only other free speech case decided during the first postincorporation decade was Stromberg v. California.225 The case involved a
19-year-old summer camp supervisor who allegedly directed camp attendees
to display a red flag––a reproduction of the flag of Soviet Russia—as part
of a daily camp ceremony.226 The camp supervisor was convicted by a jury
of violating a state law banning such displays when done for the purpose of
opposing organized government, inviting anarchistic action, or aiding
propaganda of a seditious character.227 The Court emphasized that freedom
of speech is not an “absolute” right, and that it is subject to various coverage
exceptions.228 It concluded that the state law could generally be applied
against the camp supervisor’s activities, but owing to vagueness concerns
could not be applied to acts of displaying the flag “as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government.”229
Unlike Heller, Gitlow and Whitney delegated very little interpretive
authority to the lower courts. Based on those precedents, several lower
courts upheld state syndicalism and sedition laws.230 One court––the Ohio
Supreme Court––was not yet convinced that the Free Speech Clause actually
applied against the states, although it briefly analyzed and rejected the free
speech claim anyway.231
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As in the Second Amendment context, lower court decisions took a
consistent approach to early free speech claims. Typically, they began by
observing that the free speech right was not absolute.232 The decisions then
expressed deference to legislative judgments with regard to the need to
criminalize communications constituting syndicalism and sedition.233 Some
tried their hand at applying the Court’s “clear and imminent danger”
standard, which had been adopted in the World War I era cases, but did not
engage in anything we might consider heightened scrutiny.234 In all of these
cases, the First Amendment claim was rejected.
Free speech claimants were nearly as unsuccessful in other contexts.
For example, a federal district court upheld the exclusion from the mails of
the Revolutionary Age, a Communist publication, on the ground that its
content was “indecent.”235 Under the federal postal laws, material that
incited arson, murder, or assassination could be deemed non-mailable on the
ground that it was “indecent.”236 The court rejected the publisher’s First
Amendment claim, reasoning that “use of the mails is a privilege” rather than
a right, and that the postal authorities could exclude publications that even
implicitly advocated violence.237
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Radio Commission
acted reasonably when it rejected a broadcaster’s application for renewal of
a radio license.238 The court interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting
prior restraints on publication, while “leaving to correction by subsequent
punishment those utterances or publications contrary to the public
welfare.”239 With regard to the First Amendment, the court stated that the
only question was whether the federal statute was a “reasonable exercise of
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 87 Side A
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232. See Kassay, 126 N.E. at 525 (“The right of free speech is fundamental, but it is not
absolute.”); Boloff, 7 P.2d at 780 (“It is clear that freedom of speech is not an absolute right without
limitation.”); Carr, 166 S.E. at 829 (quoting Gitlow concerning non-absolute nature of the free
speech right).
233. See id. (“The question is therefore legislative, and only becomes justiciable when
challenged on the ground that the statute has no reasonable relation to an existing evil.”); Boloff, 7
P. 2d at 776 (“it is the province of the Legislature to declare what acts are injurious to the public
welfare and to prohibit them by legislative enactment as crimes”); Lazar, 157 A. at 703 (discussing
legislative deference in incitement cases).
234. See, e.g., Boloff, 7 P. 2d at 784 (“When the threatening language has progress [sic] to the
point that it is creating a clear and present danger of action, the state need not wait until the blow
is struck, but may proceed to protect the public peace.”); Lazar, 157 A. at 703 (applying “clear and
present danger” standard).
235. Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 232 (S. D. N.Y. 1930).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 229.
238. Trinity Methodist Church v. Fed. Radio Com., 62 F.2d 850, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
239. Id.
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governmental control for the public good.”240 Since the record showed that
the broadcaster had communicated attacks on the courts, Jews, and the
Catholic Church (among others), the court held that the agency acted in the
public interest in denying its license renewal application.241
In another case, a federal district court upheld a criminal contempt of
court conviction on the ground that the defendant’s publication of a series of
articles having to do with racial politics would have the tendency or effect of
prejudicing jurors in a pending criminal trial.242 Responding to the
defendant’s claim that he had a right to comment on pending criminal
proceedings, the court wrote that freedom of speech and press “are
necessarily limited to avoid trespasses upon other rights of equal dignity.”243
The court also observed that these rights were “not paramount to other
privileges guaranteed the citizen under the Constitution,” including the right
to trial by jury.244
During this period, arguments about the hierarchy and status of different
constitutional rights were already being presented to courts. In one case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an order enjoining a defendant, then on a
crusade to expose the producers of oleomargarine in the state, from
publishing lists of such producers.245 In response to the claim that the order
violated the Free Speech Clause, the court observed:

Arguments about “first-class” and “second class” rights, and the
rankings of rights, were thus already gaining some currency in the courts. In
this instance, the free speech right was being put “in its place” as just one
Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 852.
Id.
United States. v. Sullens, 36 F.2d 230, 238 (S.D. Miss. 1929).
Id.
Id.
John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 247 N.W. 576, 582 (Wis. Sup Ct. 1932).
Id.
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240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
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This argument proceeds upon the theory that the right of free
speech, for some reason not defined, rests upon a different basis
than other rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution.
While the right of free speech may in popular estimation be
accorded a higher rank than other rights guaranteed to the citizen
by the Constitution, in a legal and constitutional sense the right
of free speech is of no greater dignity than the right to life, liberty,
property, trial by jury, freedom of conscience, and other rights
guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution.246
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247. Hill, 247 N.W. at 666–67.
248. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
249. See, e.g., Pentuff v. Park, 138 S.E. 616, 621–22 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1927) (upholding libel
judgment).
250. State v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1928).
251. Guilford, 219 N.W. at 462.
252. Id. at 460, 463.
253. Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1926).
254. Id. at 862.
255. See id. at 863 (“The courts of the Virgin Islands are not instrumentalities for the regulation
of the public press.”).
256. Id. at 865.
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among many fundamental rights entitled to no greater weight than others in
its class. Regarding the merits of the claim, the court wrote simply: “One
may not, under the cover of free speech, wrongfully do injury to the business
of another.”247
Defendants in defamation and libel cases were also generally
unsuccessful. This was, of course, well before the Supreme Court’s decision
in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, which required that state libel laws conform to
First Amendment standards.248 At the time, lower courts relied on the
Supreme Court’s statement in Gitlow, that the rights of free speech and press
were not absolute, and held that publishers were responsible for any
reputational harms––including harms suffered by public officials––that were
caused by their false statements.249
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a state public nuisance
procedure, similar to one later invalidated by the Supreme Court of the
United States as a prior restraint, as applied to a newspaper.250 “There is no
constitutional right,” the court explained, “to publish a fact merely because
it is true.”251 Indulging “every reasonable presumption” in favor of the
validity of the statute, the court concluded that the public nuisance law was
a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.252
One federal court of appeals reversed a criminal libel conviction against
a newspaper which was based upon publication of a report alleging police
misconduct.253 The decision was based on the court’s finding that the article
did not meet the statutory definition of libel rather than any constitutional
right or principle.254 The appeals court did find that the district court erred
in rendering a verdict based upon its personal belief that the press had
overstepped its proper bounds by criticizing public officers.255 However, the
same appeals court also upheld a contempt order against the defendant, who
had published an article criticizing the conduct of his bench trial on the libel
charge.256
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Gallaher v. American Legion, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 85 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1934).
Id. at 85.
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Finally, during the period under review, a New York trial court
invalidated revocation of the charter of a local chapter of the American
Legion based upon the “spirit if not the very letter” of the state and federal
constitutions.257 Specifically, the court concluded that the national
organization’s revocation of the charter, based on positions the chapter took
on matters of public concern, unreasonably inhibited the local chapter’s
freedom of speech.258 The court did not elaborate further on the First
Amendment issue.
As noted earlier, firearms proponents would undoubtedly argue that the
Court’s initial hostility to free speech claims reflects the fact that doctrines
relating to constitutional rights––including free speech––were still in their
infancy. That fact would, of course, significantly limit the force of any
argument that relied on a comparison of the success rates or records in First
Amendment and Second Amendment cases in their respective first decades.
That, however, is not the point of this comparative exercise. Rather, it
is intended to contextualize the claim that the Second Amendment has been
specially or uniquely disfavored during its first post-recognition decade.
Arguments about the proper rank or station of constitutional rights have
been circulating for a very long time. Free speech proponents once had to
argue that the First Amendment ought not to be consigned to “second-class”
status. The class of fundamental rights was new and small, and free speech
claimants were staking a claim to the top of the rights hierarchy, or at least
equal respect and dignity.
Relative to the Second Amendment in its initial decade, in its first postrecognition decade, the Free Speech Clause was subject to greater
restrictions and a much deeper level of skepticism from federal and state
courts. The Free Speech Clause was interpreted as protecting a non-absolute
right that was circumscribed by a number of coverage exceptions, and
enforced under a very deferential standard of judicial review. As noted,
some courts even treated litigants to lectures about how the free speech right
was not special. At least judged by today’s standards, during its first
enforcement decade, freedom of speech was arguably itself a “second-class”
right.
There is an even more important general lesson to be drawn from the
First Amendment’s first enforcement decade. Fundamental rights do not
come fully formed straight out of the box. They develop over very long
periods of time. Thus, although free speech was an anemic right at its
origins, the situation for free speech claimants began to improve somewhat
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in the decade subsequent to the one under consideration. Claimants began
to win some important cases, and these precedents established what would
later become basic pillars of the modern free speech right.259 However, it
would be another three decades before freedom of speech would became
“fundamental” in the sense we now tend to think of it—a strong trump
against content-based regulations of political speech, and a more general
limitation on government efforts to censor or burden expression.260
For those presently concerned about the supposed “second-class” status
of the Second Amendment, first decades ought to be considered mere
snapshots in time. They certainly do not dictate what a right will ultimately
become. Some rights flourish over time, as the Free Speech Clause certainly
has in many respects. Others do not fare as well. The first decade of Free
Speech Clause enforcement does not debunk but informs the “second-class”
complaints of contemporary gun control opponents. What the Second
Amendment has been in its first post-recognition decade may turn out to be
very different from what the right eventually becomes. The Article returns
to this theme in Part VI, its conclusion.

2. The Contemporary Free Speech Clause

02/26/2019 14:13:21

259. During the five years immediately following the Article’s study period, the Hughes Court
decided a number of cases in which free speech, press, and assembly claims were successful. See,
e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating conviction for distributing
literature on the public streets); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same). It was also
during this period that the Supreme Court indicated, in its famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products, that courts ought to review burdens on First Amendment rights with special
care. During this period, the Court sometimes referred to First Amendment rights as “preferred.”
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
260. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–72 (1964) (opining on the “central
meaning” of the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (narrowing
the categorical exclusion for speech that incites violence).
261. See, e.g., Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willet, J., dissenting)
(“Constitutional scholars have dubbed the Second Amendment ‘the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill
of Rights.’ As Judge Ho relates, it is spurned as peripheral, despite being just as fundamental as the
First Amendment.”).
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The free speech history lessons are notable, and lessons drawn from
them can provide context or perspective concerning modern Second
Amendment “second-class” claims. However, what firearms proponents
really seem to be after is the supposed “gold standard” treatment accorded to
claims under the Free Speech Clause. Measured against the modern free
speech right, critics complain, courts have substantially disfavored the right
to keep and bear arms.261
Insofar as the Supreme Court’s attention to free speech claims goes,
critics have a point––but only up to a point. The Court’s docket, particularly
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in recent years, has featured a significant number of free speech claims.262
Thus, freedom of speech has clearly not been “orphaned” by the Court, in
the way some have argued the Second Amendment has been.
However, several aspects of the free speech comparison are a result of
either caricaturing free speech doctrine or misunderstanding its scope. In
addition to admitting various coverage exceptions, the Free Speech Clause
actually permits a wide range of restrictions on expressive activity.
For example, the notion that strict scrutiny is always––or even
ordinarily––applied to free speech claims is false. Moreover, while it is true
that strict scrutiny is usually fatal when applied to speech regulations––as it
has been for core burdens on Second Amendment rights––it is not the case
that all or most speech regulations are subject to this standard. Only laws
that target or single out speech based on its subject matter or viewpoint––a
relatively small category––are subject to this standard of review.263 Among
other contexts, strict scrutiny does not apply to content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations, restrictions on expressive conduct, spending
conditions that restrict speech, regulations of government employee speech,
restrictions on the speech of public school students, many campaign finance
regulations, and so on.264
Under modern First Amendment doctrine, an “intermediate” level of
scrutiny frequently applies. Under that standard, freedom of speech can be,
and often is, outweighed by a range of governmental interests––public order,
public safety, residential privacy, workplace efficiency, educational pursuits,
and even pure aesthetics.265 Moreover, as in the case of other fundamental
rights, “tiered” scrutiny is becoming a less reliable indicator of whether these
and other interests will ultimately prevail. Thus, in some recent free speech
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 89 Side B
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262. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT (2017).
263. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 411–12 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to law targeting political speech).
264. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000) (recognizing right of “privacy” in
some “confrontational settings”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (upholding federal
funding restrictions on abortion counseling by physicians at funded programs); FCC v. Pacifica,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding order limiting time of day when indecent speech could be broadcast
on the radio); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding
restrictions on overnight camping in national parks); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S 474, 484 (1984)
(recognizing residential privacy and tranquility as substantial interests); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (allowing school officials to restrict speech that disrupts
learning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 371 (1968) (upholding conviction for public
burning of draft card).
265. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 5052
(1987) (observing that, despite the Supreme Court’s use of language suggesting heightened scrutiny
of time, place, and manner restrictions and content-neutral restrictions on speech mixed with action,
the Court often applies a deferential standard in such cases).
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266. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct 2518, 2531–32 (2014) (invalidating abortion
clinic buffer law under intermediate scrutiny); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct 1656, 1657
(2015) (upholding content-based regulation of judicial campaign speech). See also Floyd Abrams,
When Strict Scrutiny Ceased To Be Strict, SCOTUS BLOG , http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/04/s ymposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceased-to-be-strict.
267. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015)
(concluding that specialty license plates were government speech and that state could thus
discriminate based on content in approving them).
268. See generally Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318
(2018) (discussing the expansionist tendencies of freedom of “speech”).
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cases, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny that resembles strict
scrutiny––and vice versa.266 Further, the Court has also developed a
“government speech” principle that allows the state to explicitly discriminate
against private speech—notwithstanding the general rule prohibiting
content discrimination—where the government acts as a speaker rather than
as a regulator of expression.267 One wonders how opponents of firearms
restrictions would react to a similar doctrine in the Second Amendment
context.
Thus, not even the Free Speech Clause is always and everywhere treated
as a “first class” fundamental right––at least according to one of the
standards relied upon by gun rights proponents. It is no answer to say that
gun regulations must all be treated as “content-based” by analogy to the Free
Speech Clause and thus subject to strict scrutiny. The entire point of gun
control laws is to address the subject matter of guns, whereas only a narrow
class of laws offends the First Amendment’s core content-neutrality
principle. The same form of argument would result in treating all laws that
regulate private property as a violation of the Takings Clause or the Due
Process Clause, and all laws that regulate the subjects of marriage or voting
as subject to strict scrutiny owing to the fact that these laws implicate a
fundamental right.
First Amendment doctrines, like those now developing around the
Second Amendment, are far more complex and nuanced than “second-class”
claimants often suggest. The demand for strict scrutiny for all regulations of
Second Amendment rights is not a plea for parity with the Free Speech
Clause. Rather, it is an argument for a baseline of judicial scrutiny that does
not apply to any other fundamental constitutional right, including freedom
of speech.
To be sure, despite the foregoing limitations, the Free Speech Clause is
special. For a variety of reasons unique to its text, history, and cultural
salience, the free speech right has expansionist tendencies.268 Although the
Court long ago abandoned the label “preferred” as it relates to freedom of
speech, in some respects the Free Speech Clause remains first among equals.
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269. See ZICK, supra note 86, at ch. 5 (discussing the role of freedom of speech in the Civil
Rights Movement).
270. See Schauer, supra note 194.
271. See generally ZICK, supra note 86.
272. Id. at 6 (explaining free speech antecedence).
273. There is an expansive, and growing, literature devoted to these problems. See, e.g.,
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 176–82 (2016) (discussing the Free
Speech Clause’s deregulatory power); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WILL.
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Once we strip away arguments about strict scrutiny and particular doctrines,
what firearms proponents seem to want is the same degree of respect and
regard for the right to keep and bear arms that is generally accorded the
freedom of speech. So long as there is a preferred fundamental right in this
sense, anything else will, by definition, look “second-class.”
However, the quest for free speech-like specialness is problematic. The
modern free speech right is a function of a unique history and distinctive
attributes. To simplify greatly, owing to the textual and conceptual
capaciousness of “speech” and the ubiquity of communicative activity, it is
relatively easy to argue that laws implicate and regulate freedom of speech.
As a result, freedom of speech has burrowed into vast and increasingly
expansive areas of regulation, politics, and culture. Further, free speech
rights have long been a cornerstone of American democracy. They have
facilitated social movements, political mobilization, and broad constitutional
change.269
Over time, the currency of free speech arguments and their influence on
social and political discourse have contributed to what Fred Schauer calls the
“magnetism” of the Free Speech Clause.270 Owing to their salience and
influence, free speech claims seem to be irresistible to litigants and judges.
In these general respects, then, free speech is indeed special. It is little
wonder, then, that proponents of gun rights––along with advocates and
defenders of equal protection, free exercise, and other constitutional
rights—have frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause as a model and as
a means of enforcement.271 Like the free speech right, proponents of gun
rights and other fundamental rights claim that their right is antecedent––a
necessary condition for the enjoyment of other rights.272
The quest by firearms proponents for free speech-like specialness raises
important questions about the modern conception of both rights. The Free
Speech Clause’s magnetism poses some acute problems for the system of
constitutional rights. For example, critics have argued that the free speech
right crowds out other arguments, colonizes other areas of law, alters nonfree speech constitutional doctrines, and threatens broad regulatory
agendas.273 To be sure, the Second Amendment would not likely pose the
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same set of problems were it to act like the Free Speech Clause. However,
an exalted Second Amendment could pose some unique problems of its own.
It could, as some have suggested, distort constitutional discourse and deter
reasonable gun control measures.274 Broad interpretations of public carry
rights could also inhibit free speech and assembly, or complicate law
enforcement.275 Owing to these and other concerns, some might argue that
instead of leveling the Second Amendment up to make it as special as free
speech, we ought to consider leveling the Free Speech Clause down.
The analogy firearms rights proponents have drawn to freedom of
speech is more complicated than is often appreciated. The history of the free
speech right shows that in its first decade, freedom of speech was a rather
anemic fundamental right. Judged according to contemporary standards,
courts have not subjected Second Amendment claims to foreign or
disfavored doctrinal rules but rather have applied doctrines that in many
respects resemble those applied in free speech contexts. Moreover, the fact
that the Second Amendment has not (yet) attained the same veneration and
magnetism as the Free Speech Clause does not mark it as “second-class.”
Any difference in status or magnetism relates more to the unique experiences
and attributes of the free speech right than to any grand conspiracy—judicial
or otherwise—to deprive the Second Amendment of its rightful place in the
hierarchy of fundamental rights.

D. “Orphaned,” Abandoned, and Neglected Constitutional
Rights

02/26/2019 14:13:21

& MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015) (critiquing the tendency of the Free Speech Clause to colonize other
areas of law).
274. See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 10.
275. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223 (2018)
(discussing intersection between free speech and Second Amendment rights in context of public
protests and demonstrations); Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1
(2015) (discussing intersection between Fourth Amendment and open carry laws).
276. See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”).
277. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018),
cert. granted. 2019 WL 271961.
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One final complaint, associated most closely with Justice Thomas, is
that the Supreme Court has abandoned the Second Amendment by failing to
review lower court decisions and elaborate on its meaning.276 As noted
earlier, now that the Court has granted certiorari in a Second Amendment
case, that claim will itself have to be abandoned.277 Still, the concept of
abandoning or orphaning fundamental rights merits some attention.
Although we do not know why the Supreme Court accepted review in the
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recent case, it may have done so out of a concern that it was shirking its
constitutional duty to elaborate on the meaning of a constitutional right.
Correcting that misperception may influence how much ground the Court
thinks it needs to make up. This Section examines what it means to say that
a constitutional right has been orphaned, abandoned, or neglected. It shows
that the Second Amendment has not been subjected to any untoward or
exceptional treatment in this regard either, particularly relative to how other
fundamental constitutional rights have been treated by the Court.
Of course, nothing compelled the Court to take any Second Amendment
cases. There are non-abdication explanations for the Court’s failure to
review gun rights claims for the past decade. Perhaps there was some
uncertainty on the Court regarding how the Second Amendment’s doctrinal
rules ought to be constructed. Allowing lower courts to sort these rules out
in the first instance could be very helpful in terms of future decisions and
interpretations. Or perhaps the justices could not agree on a proper case to
take, or circuit split to address, or were concerned about how their colleagues
might interpret the Second Amendment.278 They may also have been aware
that the political process has generally produced robust protection for gun
rights, thus reducing the need for judicial action. Or they may have been
concerned that a broad interpretation of the Second Amendment, for instance
one relating to public carry rights, could have negative consequences in
terms of public safety. All of these factors, and others, likely reduced the
incentives for Supreme Court intervention.
There is no established standard or metric for determining whether or
when the Court has orphaned, abandoned, or neglected a constitutional right.
If orphaning a right means to permanently abandon it, that is clearly not the
case with regard to the Second Amendment. It seems likely that the Court
will continue to add Second Amendment cases to its future docket.
As the life cycle of other fundamental rights shows, a decade-long
silence does not a constitutional orphan make. Moreover, fundamental rights
can be abandoned or neglected at birth, only to be reunited with the family
of fundamental rights later on. Finally, in terms of doctrinal neglect, the
Second Amendment has not suffered nearly the long-term effects that other
rights, or certain aspects of them, have experienced.
It might make sense to think of the Second Amendment as having been
“orphaned” or abandoned during the long era prior to Heller, during which
the Court failed to recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms. On
this view, Heller actually rescued the Second Amendment from its initial
abandonment. We might say the same thing about the Free Speech Clause,
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which the Court essentially abandoned until the first quarter of the twentieth
century when it addressed World War I era sedition cases. Judged according
to this historical standard, a decade––or even three––of silence pales in
comparison to the abandonment of these provisions in their early years.
The true orphans of the Constitution, it would seem, are those that have
been forever abandoned or effectively banished from the class of
fundamental rights. There are several obvious examples. Owing to its
effective abandonment, one commentator has dubbed the Third Amendment,
which restricts the quartering of soldiers in private homes, “the Rodney
Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights.”279 Judge Robert Bork famously dismissed
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights not enumerated elsewhere in
the Constitution as an “inkblot.”280 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause was effectively abandoned in 1873, when the
Slaughterhouse-House Cases held that it did not protect a broad range of
fundamental rights.281
Moreover, certain fundamental rights have been orphaned or abandoned
through absorption or collapse into other provisions. The equality and
substantive rights aspects of the Privileges and Immunities Clause are now
performed by the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause,
respectively. Looking to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has not
based any decision on the Assembly Clause in more than three decades.282
Ditto the Petition Clause, which the Court long appended to the Assembly
Clause before turning it into a right of expressive association.283 The Press
Clause has received more attention from the Court, but like the assembly and
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279. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foreword: The Third Amendment in the 21st Century, 82
TENN. L. REV. 491, 491 (2015) (“For many years, the Third Amendment to the Constitution has
been the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights, getting no respect.”).
280. Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due
Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 97–98 (2000) (quoting
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 117 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork),
reprinted in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 441 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993)).
281. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The Court did rely on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), which held that the right to interstate
travel was protected by the provision. However, it has refused to re-engage with the clause in other
respects, including incorporation of fundamental rights. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010).
282. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1098 (2016).
283. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
(2012).
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284. See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123
YALE L.J. 412, 416 (2013).
285. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
286. See Sonja West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011).
287. ZICK, supra note 86, at 77–78.
288. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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petition rights the Court has more or less collapsed freedom of the press into
the Free Speech Clause.284
To be sure, the Court has not altogether ignored these “expressive”
rights. Some decisions have at least referenced the Assembly Clause.285
However, the Court has not expressly elaborated or constructed the meaning
of the Assembly Clause, or accepted “Assembly Clause” cases for review.
Further, the Court has often written about the values served by a free press;
but that has not resulted in any distinctive interpretations of freedom of the
press.286 Finally, the Court has indicated that the Petition Clause more or
less overlaps with the Free Speech Clause, and declined to elaborate further.
The general approach has been to collapse all of these rights into a fictional
“Free Expression Clause.”287
Thus, some enumerated constitutional rights have indeed been
orphaned or abandoned by the Supreme Court. However, the Second
Amendment has not experienced anything like this kind of treatment. The
Court has clearly not forever abandoned the provision or abdicated its role
as the final interpreter of its meaning. Even before the recent grant, the
Supreme Court had not treated the Second Amendment as anachronistic,
indecipherable, or ancillary to some other constitutional right.
The real complaint appears to be that the Court has neglected the
Second Amendment by failing to address its meaning during the past decade.
Free Speech Clause proponents could have made a similar argument during
the decades after that provision was recognized as a fundamental right. As
discussed earlier, in the first decade the Court accepted only three cases for
review, and its decisions did not add anything of substance to the
interpretation of the free speech right.
Recognizing a fundamental right and subsequently failing to elaborate
its meaning is a rather mild form of neglect when judged according to the
experience of other rights and aspects of those rights. For example, the
Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in 1878, in
Reynolds v. United States.288 Reviewing a federal prosecution for bigamy,
the Court narrowly construed the free exercise right to prohibit Congress
from restricting or punishing a person’s religious beliefs, but to permit it to
broadly regulate conduct through criminal and other laws. Twelve years
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later, in dicta, the Court reaffirmed the belief/conduct distinction.289 And
there matters stood, until the Court incorporated the free exercise right in the
1940s.290 It would be another two decades before the Court finally
abandoned the belief/conduct distinction and adopted a form of heightened
scrutiny for free exercise claims.291 If neglect is measured in decades, the
Second Amendment has a very long way to go.
Other constitutional rights have suffered from extensive postrecognition neglect. For example, the Court suggested in the 1960s, and then
again in the 1980s, that there is a right of “intimate association.”292 However,
in the ensuing decades, it has not elaborated on the scope or substance of the
right.293 The right sometimes makes a cameo appearance, as it did in the
Court’s recent marriage equality decision, but otherwise remains a
mystery.294
The Court has also neglected, for varying periods, specific aspects or
dimensions of fundamental rights. This has been true of several aspects of
the Free Speech Clause. For example, although the Court held in 1969 that
public school students enjoyed free speech rights, it did not elaborate on
those rights for almost two decades.295 During the 1960s, the Court indicated
that public university students enjoy robust free speech rights.296 However,
the Court has not taken many free speech cases in that context since. As a
result, it has largely been left to lower courts to ascertain, for example, what
constitutional standard applies to student speech and how the First
Amendment applies more generally on public university campuses.297
Finally, again in the free speech area, in 1942 the Court cast “purely
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289. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
290. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
291. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405–06 (1963).
292. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (relying on marital association to
invalidate restrictions on distribution and receipt of contraceptive information); Roberts v. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984) (referring to the right, but not elaborating upon it).
293. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980)
(tracing the origins of the right but noting that its parameters are unclear).
294. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–600 (2015) (observing that same-sex
couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association).
295. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
296. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court has addressed issues
relating to recognition of student groups and funding issues. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972);
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of Regents v.
Southworth, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999). However, none of these precedents address standards specific
to university student speech.
297. See John D. Inazu, The Purpose (and Limits) of the University, UTAH L. REV. (2018);
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801
(2017).
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commercial advertising” outside the domain of the First Amendment.298
There it languished until 1976, when the Court concluded that commercial
speech was entitled to some First Amendment protection.299
There are other examples of rights, or aspects of rights, that the Court
has neglected for far longer than a decade if not abandoned altogether. Since
2008, the Supreme Court has essentially left it to lower courts to flesh out
the meaning of the right to habeas corpus in cases involving suspected
terrorists.300 The original Constitution contains a prohibition on state
impairment of contracts.301 However, the Court’s early interpretation of this
provision led to the right’s effective abandonment or at least its severe
neglect in subsequent decades.302
Judged in relation to these examples, the Court’s initial silence
regarding Second Amendment rights has been neither unusual nor a cause
for marked concern. It is not indicative of the kind of abandonment or severe
neglect that other fundamental rights have experienced. A decade is not a
very long time in terms of the life span of a constitutional right. In
comparative terms, the argument that the Court had “orphaned” the Second
Amendment or subjected it to severe neglect was at least premature. It should
not encourage or suggest making up for lost ground in future Second
Amendment cases.

Conclusion – The Second Amendment’s Second Act
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298. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
299. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761–62
(1976).
300. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 24 (suggesting that the Court has been absent from the
debate over habeas corpus rights of alleged enemy aliens after Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008)).
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
302. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
303. See generally ZICK, supra note 86.
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The principal burden of this Article has been to assess the merits of
various claims that the Second Amendment, as it has been interpreted and
enforced, is a “second-class” constitutional right. As the foregoing analysis
shows, fundamental rights are dynamic constructs. As the experiences of the
Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and other fundamental rights
suggest, what the Second Amendment has been in its first decade will not
determine what it will become in its second decade and beyond.
The dynamics that affect constitutional rights tend to play out over the
course of long periods of time, and in response to a variety of influences and
circumstances.303 As Professor Jack Balkin has observed:
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Rights are not simply a fixed set of protections that the state
affords or fails to afford. Rights are a terrain of struggle in a
world of continuous change—a site of ongoing controversies, a
battleground where the shape and contours of the terrain are
remade with each victory. Rights, and particularly fundamental
rights, far from being fixed and immovable, are moving targets.
They are worth fighting over because the discourse of rights has
power and because that discourse can be reshaped and is
reshaped through intellectual debate and political struggle.304
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304. Balkin, supra note 54, at 53–54.
305. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483; Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977).
306. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963) (applying heightened scrutiny to
free exercise claim), with Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to certain free exercise claims).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 94 Side A

Fundamental rights can retract or expand, depending on their unique
dynamics. The right to contraception, which was first characterized as an
aspect of the privacy of the marital relationship, was extended to unmarried
persons and then to minors.305 The scope of the right to abortion, first
recognized in Roe, was diminished as a result of the Court’s decision in
Casey.
Fundamental rights can also experience peaks and valleys. Think of the
wild ride of the Free Exercise Clause, which started out as a narrow ban on
suppression of belief, morphed into a fundamental right protected under
heightened judicial scrutiny, and is now once again a relatively narrow
prohibition on certain types of discriminatory measures.306
As discussed, freedom of speech offers still another case study in the
transformation of fundamental rights. From its humble beginnings, the free
speech right has vaulted all the way to the top of the fundamental rights
hierarchy. The change in status was a result of decades of activism,
litigation, political and cultural upheaval, public discourse, and doctrinal
change.
Firearms proponents who are presently concerned about the status of
the right to keep and bear arms can take some comfort in these
transformation narratives. Heller’s legacy has thus far not been what
firearms rights proponents––and, frankly, opponents––had expected.
However, the Second Amendment will not become an “inkblot.” It is not
going to be collapsed into some other constitutional right, or abandoned for
all time. Indeed, its second act, in terms of Supreme Court review, is just
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beginning. The Second Amendment seems likely to retain its “A-list” status,
and may even improve its position in the hierarchy of fundamental rights.
Predictions are perilous. However, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court will ultimately recognize some form of Second Amendment right to
carry firearms in public. It may also invalidate certain burdensome
restrictions on non-core aspects of the Second Amendment, including those
that limit self-defense outside the home. It also seems likely to eventually
address the issue of whether the Second Amendment allows states to ban
assault-style rifles or other types of arms. Given the current makeup of the
Court, it does not seem a stretch to predict that in its second decade the
Second Amendment’s scope will expand––perhaps to a considerable degree.
Of course, it is also possible that the Second Amendment will
experience a different sort of life cycle. There may be peaks and valleys.
The right to keep and bear arms may expand incrementally. Along with
notable victories, firearms proponents may experience some setbacks. As it
decides on the proper course, the Supreme Court ought not to do so under
the mistaken impression that the Second Amendment and the Heller decision
are targets of resistance, hostility, or rebellion in the lower courts. They
ought not to feel hurried to stem a tide of resistance that does not exist, or to
correct a course not actually traveled. There is no constitutional “orphan” to
rescue.
The Second Amendment is not now, and is not likely to be, a “secondclass” fundamental right. Its fate will ultimately depend on the dynamic
influences that have affected other fundamental rights and situated them
within our dynamic system of constitutional rights. In its second decade and
beyond, as the Second Amendment becomes a permanent member of the
class or family of fundamental constitutional rights, the process of
normalizing the right to keep and bear arms––politically, doctrinally, and
theoretically––will continue to unfold in the ordinary course. That process
ought not to be influenced by a desire to over-compensate for purported lost
opportunities or lost time.
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